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Abstract            
Electoral competition has been an essential part of acquiring the American presidency since 
Jackson’s election of 1828. Competition made strategic considerations to ensure the maximization of 
electoral support increasingly relevant. One phenomenon that traditionally dominated strategic 
thinking during American elections is ‘Outsiderism’: during campaigns candidates deliberately assume 
an outsider position in the electoral arena, not on the basis of genuine motivations, but for the 
categorical purpose of vote-maximization. Despite the fact that Outsiderism has constantly been 
deployed over the course of history, it has yet to receive scholarly attention. This thesis, therefore, 
offers an analysis of Outsiderism in the realm of American presidential campaigns. It investigates 
Outsiderism’s roots in the subsequent campaigns of Jackson and Van Buren through an analysis of 
their respective campaign biographies. Furthermore, it links Outsiderism to the framework of Rational 
Choice Theory, which elucidates the rather manipulative motives that induce Outsiderism. Thus, this 
thesis seeks to clarify to what extent Jackson and Van Buren conformed to Outsiderism during their 
campaign. Why did they as would-be presidents see the need to present themselves (to a certain 
extent) as outsiders to American politics? The results suggest that both Jackson and Van Buren as 
presidential candidates employed Outsiderism, although Jackson to a lesser extent than Van Buren, 
because they deemed it as advantageous for garnering the required support to get elected. As a result, 
they have paved the way for a campaign strategy that has remained dominant until today. 
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1. Introduction           
In anticipation of the 2016 presidential elections, Rolling Stones Magazine held an interview 
with Republican candidate Donald Trump. He could have elaborated on his own policy, but chose not 
to. He could have reacted to another candidate’s policy flaws, but he did neither. Instead, Trump 
targeted his fellow Republican candidate Carly Fiorina. Angrily and pejoratively, Trump cried: “Look 
at that face! Would anyone vote for that? Can you imagine that, the face of our next president?!” The 
audience responded with laughter of approval and triumphant applause. Trump continued: “I mean, 
she’s a woman, and I’m not s’posedta say bad things, but really, folks, come on. Are we serious?” (in 
Solotaroff) 
Trump’s explicitly sexist and taunting attack on the former Hewlett-Packard CEO is in line 
with what German-American novelist and journalist Henry Mencken ascertained in 1918: 
“[c]ivilization […] grows more and more maudlin and hysterical; especially under democracy it tends 
to degenerate into a mere combat of crazes […]” (29). Mencken’s general description referred to a 
belligerent and apocalyptical rhetoric that influences the American electoral system as well. It is 
largely defined by a struggle for popularity: politicians will do whatever it takes to win over the 
American voters and thus to get elected into office. If that means they must insult, they will. One 
particular phenomenon that traditionally has dominated American strategic thinking is ‘Outsiderism’. 
Outsiderism entails a campaign strategy in which candidates deliberately assume an outsider position 
in the electoral arena for the explicit purpose of vote-maximization. In the 2016 election, Trump 
seemed to epitomize this, but the roots and historical prevalence of this strategy suggest that it has 
played a role for much longer. However, strategic considerations that ensure the maximization of 
electoral support, such as Outsiderism, have not always been key features of American politics.  
Prior to Andrew Jackson’s office-taking in 1829, Outsiderism played a small part in electoral 
spheres. In the period from George Washington to John Quincy Adams, the American presidency was 
characterized by a patrician era instead (Ketcham; Skowronek 52-4, 61-127). In this era, American 
presidents, “[…] despite many substantial differences in both ideology and political practice […]” 
(Ketcham xi), shared and emphasized one fundamental ideal: the positive ideal of nonpartisan 
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leadership. Their perception of non-partisanship stemmed from the Puritan principles of leadership 
morale and the post-Revolutionary notions of sovereignty and independence (Ketcham 4-7, 14-20), 
which effectively meant that presidential succession was the result of deliberation rather than of 
competition. This is not to say that competition never occurred before; it did, albeit sporadically, but 
feuds were generally solved within elitist spheres. Moreover, of great contribution to the elitist 
perception of good and virtuous leadership was Bolingbroke’s essay, “[…] not so much that [it] had 
substantial direct influence […], but rather that the essay drew together and expressed eloquently ideas 
that were widely popular [among patrician presidents]” (Ketcham 68). In his work, Bolingbroke 
argues that true legitimacy of power lies in the interests of the people: “[t]he good of the people is the 
ultimate and true end of government” and “[g]overnors are […] appointed […] by that law of nature 
and reason” (Bolingbroke 119). According to Bolingbroke, this collective-directed end can only be 
met when an authoritative figure becomes a ‘Patriot King’ who adheres to genuine virtues, like 
selflessness and disinterestedness (Ketcham 61-2). 
In the sense of morality, the Patriot King comes close to De Tocqueville’s observation that 
“[t]here are virtuous and peaceful individuals whose pure morality, quiet habits, affluence, and talents, 
fit them to be the leaders of the surrounding population” (11). Yet, Bolingbroke’s utopian view of 
leadership goes beyond De Tocqueville’s formulation, as it explicitly links morality to the idea of 
nonpartisanship. Bolingbroke claims that nonpartisanship is inherent to good leadership, as this 
ensures that, as James Madison put it, political leaders keep “[…] an attention to the interest of the 
whole society […]” (Madison 186). Partisanship, in contrast, is unethical, because factions only aspire 
the interests of the few, which, consequently, would undermine the legitimacy of power (Ketcham 61-
66). On the basis of Bolingbroke’s work, Ketcham claims that “[a] deep attachment to precisely this 
[nonpartisanship], that a good leader will resist the unwelcome intrusions of party, characterized the 
first six American presidents” (66). Moreover, nonpartisanship in the patrician era led to a ‘president 
above party’ style of leadership, in which actions stemmed from deliberation among elitists who, with 
an exception here and there, were free of factional conflict (Skowronek 52, 54). 
The patrician era, however, proved to be relatively ephemeral and it was succeeded by a 
partisan structure with the presidencies of Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren. This 
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transformation, certainly, gave way to a departure from the nonpartisan ideal as well: party 
organization now largely came to determine presidential action, as presidents became clear 
representatives of their party (Skowronek 54). This transformation finds its origins in the growing 
“[…] spirit of commerce and industry […]” (Mill 72), which brought economic prosperity to average, 
middle-class Americans. De Tocqueville has made a similar argument on the role of the expanding 
American economy. Ketcham circumscribes De Tocqueville’s conception by stating “[…] that the 
commercial, enterprising style was the irresistible wave of the future and […] was advancing in its 
most undiluted form in America” (Ketcham 159). Ketcham claims that this socioeconomic spirit 
fostered the idea that the government had not only democratic, but also commercial obligations to the 
people. But as people had diverging commercial interests, they also had different political aims 
(Ketcham 160-1). Van Buren, “[…] who most clearly perceived the significance of this difference 
[…]”, developed “[…] a revised attitude toward party” that “changed the nature and style of leadership 
[…]” (Ketcham 141): not only did he frame a positive image of political parties, but he also repudiated 
the elitist and arrogant elements of nonpartisanship in the years that followed (Ketcham 141-50).  
Yet, it was already since the Jackson administrations that the contours of partisanship had 
become evident. Following a “palace struggle” (Skowronek 137) between the more radical Vice 
President Calhoun and the moderate President Jackson, the latter adopted a new style of party politics 
that allowed him to remove Calhoun from the political field and thus to regain full control of the 
executive branch. The intensification of partisan pressures came to outline Jackson’s policy within 
governmental institutions (Skowronek 137-54), and created a partisanship that is still dominant in the 
American political arena today. Consequently, since the Jacksonian era, presidents not only acted 
based on what they believed was the greater national good, but simultaneously had to control their 
party in order to be effective (Borden 131). With the presidencies of Jackson and Van Buren, 
therefore, the Ketchamesque notion of president above party evolved into a conceptualization of the 
presidency that assimilated presidential responsibilities with partisan tasks as well.  
One of the major implications of this new era’s party politics was the acceleration of highly 
vigorous competition between the two political camps for power positions like the presidency 
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(Skowronek 32).
1
 The institutionalization of competition proved that political parties were not only 
excellent vehicles to organize competitive presidential campaigns, but competition through party also 
enabled the population to distribute power and, thus, to remain in control of it. Parties were therefore 
predominantly regarded as “[…] the life blood of a democratic nation” (Ketcham 143). A lack of 
competition, on the other hand, marked oppression and despotism, or at least facilitated political 
incompetence and lethargy, Van Buren and his assemblage agreed (Ketcham 143-4). Additionally, in 
an effort to “revive the old contest between federals and anti-federals” (Van Buren, in Ketcham 144), 
Jackson and Van Buren, as well as many other politics figures, successfully attempted to incorporate 
their competitive rhetoric and ethics in different governmental institutions. In sum, since the campaign 
of 1828 that Jackson had won, “[…] competition rather than harmony” had become “the measure of 
the healthy state” (Ketcham 144). This standard has remained ever since; indeed, it is no coincidence 
that a century later Schumpeter defined democracy in terms of the “[…] competitive struggle for 
votes” (269).  
Partisan-based electoral competition also provided the new tools for obtaining political power 
in America. Van Buren perhaps understood this best. He “[…] had been the clever politician balancing 
sectional interests and responding to them to gain political power, a skill in which he took pride […]” 
(Ketcham 146). In the decades that followed after the presidencies of Jackson and Van Buren, the 
struggle for popularity through campaigning continued. With great aversion, J.Q. Adams, patron of the 
old patrician age and opponent of Jacksonian partisanship, remarked that in these years there existed a 
“[…] fashion of peddling for popularity by travelling round the country gathering crowds together, 
hawking for public dinners, and spouting empty speeches” (Adamsa 25). As this race for popularity in 
an over-competitive electoral environment became increasingly permanent, Adams concluded that 
partisanship accelerated “[…] the corruption of the popular elections, both by violence and fraud” (in 
Ketcham 146). 
                                                          
1 Cynics could justly argue that the patrician era had not been completely free from competitive struggle either. For one, the 
election of 1800 between President John Adams and Vice-President Jefferson exemplified this, while the subsequent 
Revolution of 1800 was a direct result of difficulties posed by presidential competition in a nonpartisan environment (Larson 
29-33). However, notions of non-partisanship and virtuous service still remained dominant in this era, and therefore 
Jefferson’s competitive approach is best regarded as the exception to the rule, or at most as a premature indicator for 
changing social sentiments, rather than as proof of complete or large-scale integration of competition prior to 1828. 
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Indeed, in the centuries that followed, electoral competition remained at the forefront of 
presidential elections and, accordingly, of succession. To defeat rivals, presidential candidates have 
adopted strategic frameworks to generate maximum electoral support and, given the potential impact 
of strategies on elections, the study of strategic positioning exists as long as politics do. It dates back 
to the Rome of 64 B.C., where Cicero was one of the firsts to discuss such strategies in his rather 
calculating letters to his brother. He argued that when running for office “[…] you cannot afford to 
make any mistakes. You must conduct a flawless campaign with the greatest thoughtfulness, industry 
and care” (27), which for Cicero meant relying on the combination of personal attachment, hope and 
favors (33). Likewise, a candidate can persuade voters and thus secure an electoral victory by 
exploiting others’s anxieties and by making promises, even when he knows he cannot keep them (85).  
Similarly, Machiavelli set out what makes the most successful leaders, albeit in a less 
outspoken, but nonetheless equally manipulative and galvanizing account. In his 1532 Il Principe, he 
asserts that political success is determined by a leader’s skills to anticipate to a situation with either the 
power of a lion or the cunningness of a fox. But also in more recent times dozens of scholars have 
written about campaign strategies, particularly in the United States (US). Among those are, for 
instance, Polsby and Wildavsky, who offer a profound and almost eclectic theoretical work on 
strategies in American elections, and Boller, who provides a wide-ranging overview of the political 
trickery that is so embedded in the American campaign structure. Yet, although the plethora of 
literature on campaigning strategies in the US confirms that “[n]o political office on earth attracts 
more interest than the American presidency” (McKay 487), the adoption of an outsider position as an 
explicit strategic choice has been given insufficient scholarly attention. This gap is remarkable, 
especially because one could claim that this strategy – hereinafter referred to as ‘Outsiderism’ – has 
been an ever-present component of American campaigns since the partisan structure substantiated. 
In the eyes of Cicero, you are an outsider candidate when “[y]ou are not part of nobility, yet 
you seek the highest office in the land” (23). But in terms of definition, Outsiderism goes beyond 
one’s socio-political position, insofar that it is irrelevant what your position in the system de facto is, 
or how politically experienced you are. Instead, Outsiderism entails the discursive and explicit 
strategic choice of candidates to present themselves to the electorate as outsiders to the political 
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system and adversaries to the political establishment, regardless of what their factual political position 
is. Consequently, candidates from within the political system can engage in Outsiderism, too. In 
addition, because candidates employ Outsiderism as a means to vote-maximization, it must be 
considered a strategic and rhetorical device as opposed to an absolute ideological conviction for 
governmental composition, as will be clarified in chapter 2. This definition of Outsiderism is a new 
and original concept. Given that existing concepts on campaign strategies have failed to fully grasp the 
importance of the outsider role, an original definition of this role is deemed requisite. 
This thesis investigates the roots of Outsiderism in America’s competitive electoral field. It 
seeks to clarify to what extent Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren conformed to Outsiderism 
during their campaign. Did they as candidates see the need to present themselves (to a certain extent) 
as outsiders to American politics, and if so, why was this the case? As the origins of Outsiderism 
converged with the transition to the partisan era, this thesis explores the presidential elections of 1828, 
1832 and 1836 that led to the subsequent presidencies of Jackson and Van Buren. Cicero had 
suggested that an outsider status unequivocally has negative implications: compared to insiders, 
outsiders are more vulnerable to criticism and lack the support of followers (5). However, contrary to 
Cicero’s argument, I will argue that both Jackson and Van Buren employed Outsiderism, although 
Jackson to a lesser extent than Van Buren, because it is advantageous for garnering the required 
support to get elected. Moreover, the analyses of Jackson and Van Buren seems to suggest that many 
more candidates since then have conformed to Outsiderism, because they believed it to be an effective 
means to gain electoral support – so much so that it has become a tradition in US campaigning.  
In support of this thesis statement, the thesis builds on the ontological foundations of Rational 
Choice Theory (RCT) in the light of strategic campaign behavior. RCT is positioned in the realist 
segment of political science and is, in fact, in line with the rational ideas of both Cicero and 
Machiavelli. Rationality, in this sense refers to the theoretical assumption that an actor’s actions are 
solely based on self-interest and a gains and losses calculation that is free of any moral intrusion. As a 
result, this decision-making process is commonly referred to as the logic of consequences (Hindmoora 
1-6, 193-9). Such a theoretical framework is congruent with the strategic character of the thesis 
statement and helps to clarify the rather manipulative motives that induce Outsiderism.  
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Furthermore, the investigation of Outsiderism relies on the close reading of one type of 
primary source in particular: the biographies of candidates that were published in the spirit of 
presidential campaigns. The scientific approach of the thesis is thus rather traditional, as its analyses 
derive from the study of literary works. Moreover, given that a study of biographies is inherently a 
study of the minds of individual candidates, the campaign biographies provide a unique opportunity to 
examine first-hand to what extent candidates tried to persuade the electorate through Outsiderism. 
With the campaigns and biographies of Jackson and Van Buren as the subject of analysis here, this 
thesis provides insights in the roots and the historical use of Outsiderism in the competitive electoral 
field of the US. In doing so, the analysis emphasizes the campaign biographies of the winning 
candidates over those of the losing candidates for methodological reasons that will be clarified later 
on, although the biographies of losing candidates are not fully neglected.  
The next chapter provides the theoretical framework of Outsiderism by presenting an eclectic 
conceptualization. It explains what Outsiderism precisely entails and why the outsider role and its 
popular and republicanist discourse are appealing to the American people. It presents two ideological 
reasons that help interpret Outsiderism’s appeal: the first involves the public prevalence of socio-
cultural principles like distrust, anti-intellectualism and anti-professionalism, particularly in their 
voting behavior. As that chapter will demonstrate, these sentiments give rise to an anti-governmental 
rhetoric that underlies Outsiderism and that is shared with populism and republicanism. The second is 
contiguous: the outsider position helps candidates to distance themselves from the American political 
elite that is so distrusted in American society and associated with corruption, incompetence and 
control. Because Outsiderism, thus, is a reaction to an overall anti-elitist sentiment, there evidently is 
overlap with populist and republicanist sentiments. The next chapter demonstrates how candidates 
appropriate and exploit this collection of public sentiments to garner the support of the American 
people. Finally, it puts Outsiderism in the context of RCT. It redefines Downs’s model, which claims 
that candidates adopt a median position during campaigns, by incorporating polarization in the model. 
This neo-Downsian model helps to explain why the adoption of an outsider position is beneficial to 
presidential candidates.  
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2. The Concept of Outsiderism        
Polsby and Wildavsky set out a number of systemic electoral pressures around which “[…] 
aspirants for the presidency […] construct extremely complex plans of action” (1). Among the 
hundreds of pressures that influence the shaping of campaign strategies, many are as sporadically 
present as the individual candidates who come and go. Polsby and Wildavsky consider many 
strategies, including party-specific strategies, but, like most scholars who deal with the strategic 
aspects of campaigns (e.g. Bartels; Gurian; Iyengar and Simon; Newman), they, too, have neglected 
Outsiderism as a vote-maximizing strategy. This is inherently problematic for understanding 
campaigning in the US, because the use of Outsiderism has been large in scale throughout history. 
Furthermore, Outsiderism deserves more conceptual scrutiny than it has yet received. Admittedly, the 
road of its origins – that is, the road from patrician to partisan politics along competitive lines – has 
been clarified, and a somewhat concise definition of Outsiderism as a vote-maximizing strategy has 
been presented. Nonetheless, the introductory description is far from complete, as it did not explicitly 
address the ideological backbone that motivates the use of this strategy: this backbone consists of the 
sentiments that dominate the political thinking of the American electorate and that Outsiderist 
candidates, as a result, strategically appeal to in their rhetoric.  
In 2004, Jerit wrote an article on the rhetorical approaches in American campaigns. She noted 
that “[…] candidates have strong incentives to evoke emotions such as anger, fear, and anxiety”, 
because “[…] appeals that are high in emotional content will survive longer than other types of 
arguments” (563-4). Although she made these remarks with regards to contemporary politics, her logic 
has also been true in many historical cases. Moreover, her conception ties to an essential component of 
Outsiderism: the calculating nature of candidates, for whom all means are justified to reach the end of 
becoming president. If they must play the audience by evoking emotions, then they must do so. 
Consequently, Outsiderism leaves little room for compromise and political discussion. Moreover, 
while Jerit does not directly link rhetoric to theoretical concepts – Outsiderism or otherwise – her 
assertion illustrates considerable overlap with both Outsiderism and populism in terms of semantics, as 
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for both the rhetorical components depend on the utilization (some would say: exploitation) of 
negative emotions among the electorate.  
Indeed, rhetorically, Outsiderism depends heavily upon populism. Populism is defined as the 
political doctrine that affirms that “[…] liberty and hence self-control through participation are 
obtained by embodying the will of the people […]” (Rikera 11). Evidently, its focus on the people’s 
sovereignty articulates a strong affiliation with the ideology of republicanism as well. Developed by 
the Founding Fathers on the basis of the political formation of the ancient Greek and Roman empires, 
republicanism claims that true freedom is defined in terms of non-domination and non-interference: 
freedom means self-mastery by the people through sacrificing individual interests for the common 
good, and through a virtuous leadership
2
 that rejects the existence of an aristocratic system that breeds 
patronage and nepotism (Pettit 22-7; Wood 48-65). The essentials of republicanism, as well as the 
hopes for the New World and the aversion of the Old, were accurately captured in a 1778 New Jersey 
newspaper: 
 
Here Governments their last perfection take. 
Erected only for the People’s sake: 
Founded no more on Conquest or in blood, 
But on the basis of the Public Good. 
No contests then shall mad ambition raise, 
No chieftains quarrel for a sprig of praise, 
No thrones shall rise, provoking lawless sway, 
And not a King to cloud the blissful day. 
(in Wood 55)  
 
Populist rhetoric builds on this republicanist logic by emphasizing the status quo disparity 
between popular and elite interests through clear and evoking emotional appeals (Jerit 564-8; Lukacs; 
                                                          
2 Virtuous leadership, in this sense, directly relates to Bolingbroke’s definition, which dominated American political thinking 
until the partisan era.  
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Rikera 11-6), often with (implicit) reference to the log cabin myth, which candidates utilize to 
demonstrate that they are descendants “[…] of humble circumstances and modest station […]” (Pessen 
2). This myth fits populist thought well and demonstrates the need for more republicanism, as “[i]t 
signifies […] that the people who rule are not the people” (Pessen 183). Additionally, populist rhetoric 
is comparatively negative, confrontational, seditious, and occasionally apocalyptical, as its primary 
aim is to appeal to emotions like hatred and fear (Jerit 565-8). Along these lines Hofstadter claims that 
American politics are pejorative, and refers to this cluster of expressions as a “paranoid style” 
(Hofstadterc 3-40). In this regard, one should note that populism does not refer to the left-wing 
Populist movement of the 1890s in America that scholars like Richard Hofstadter have analyzed
3
; 
instead, it refers to a broader view on government-citizen relations that may occur on either side of the 
political spectrum, which is expressed through popular-oriented rhetoric.  
Outsiderism has thus adopted many of these rhetorical elements from populism and 
republicanism. Because Outsiderism involves the strategic positioning of candidates in the corners of 
most political dimensions, it depends on populism and republicanism for its anti-governmental and 
anti-elitist discourse, with other emotional appeals often following in its tracks – not the least of which 
is conspiracy-thinking, or the idea that the government tries to undermine American values and ideals 
(Hofstadterc 29). Yet, the theoretical overlap between Outsiderism vis-à-vis populism does not mean 
that the two are equals in terms of definition. Outsiderism is intrinsically a vote-maximizing strategy; 
it is a means of mobilizing the masses that has been used since Caesar’s Rome, rather than a sincere 
conviction on how the government should be organized. Or, to paraphrase Hofstadter, the Outsiderist 
“[s]tyle has to do with the way in which ideas are […] advocated rather than with the truth or falsity of 
their content” (Hofstadterc 5). Populism, in contrast, is not de facto a strategy: it can be used as such, 
but it is equally plausible that populism stems from genuine concerns about how the political 
landscape is and must be structured. In other words, while the two have rhetorical similarities their 
aims do not necessarily meet. Thus, Outsiderism assumes the combination of a vote-maximizing 
strategic frame with an ideological populist- and republicanist-oriented anti-governmental discourse. 
Modelling Outsiderism accordingly raises two important questions. First, why does the Outsiderist 
                                                          
3 For the Populist movement, see Hofstadtera.  
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strategy rely heavily on the anti-establishment and anti-governmental thinking of populist and 
republicanist rhetoric; second, how can the appeal of the Outsiderist framework as a strategy best be 
explained theoretically, given that presidential candidates en masse are drawn to it?  
 
i. Popular Sentiments in America 
 To answer the first question, one must closely examine the cultural and ideological facets of 
American social thought. It seems that Outsiderist candidates often employ and have employed anti-
governmental rhetoric, because many Americans adhere to sentiments that coincide along anti-
governmental lines. Perhaps the most obvious sentiment worth mentioning is the socio-cultural 
institutionalization of governmental distrust and cynicism. In a persuasive and well-researched article, 
Miller analyzes American distrust of politics through a psychological and attitudinal approach. He 
claims that “[…] negative orientation toward the political system […]” (Millera 951) has ubiquitously 
defined American thought. It stems from the perception that the government is doing too little to 
promote the people’s needs, and therefore does not function properly. People are confronted with 
social conflicts; when these are persistent and social change does not follow, people experience “[…] 
feelings of powerlessness and normlessness”, which “are very likely to be accompanied by hostility 
toward political and social leaders, the institutions of government, and the regime as a whole” (Millera 
951). 
 Governmental distrust is not a recent phenomenon. Wills is one of the authors who asserts this 
claim. He ascertains that the trend of governmental distrust finds its origins at the end of the American 
Revolution. According to Wills, the “[…] instinctive suspicion that an evil empire lurks inside the 
capital beltway” (Ellis 420) is inherent to American popular thinking. While his analysis of socio-
political values in itself is not revolutionary, his main argument is. Wills claims that American anti-
government sentiments are often based on “[…] the misreadings of history that seem to give 
authoritative warrant to that [governmental] resistance” (21). In an effort to rectify these 
misunderstandings, he addresses the romanticized yet false myths of the American Revolution and the 
Constitution that have been created by opponents of government to promote anti-governmental 
sentiments.  
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These myths primarily emphasize that a central authority in America should occupy a limited 
task, as the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution meant to prescribe (Wills 23). But as Wills 
states, this notion rests on misinterpretations of both writings. An example of this is the separation of 
governmental branches: according to Wills, this division was intended as “[…] a division of labor, not 
of powers”, because one “branch could not perform adequately or efficiently by itself” (Morgan 40). 
The notion that it explicitly aimed to divide powers, nevertheless, has become a crucial part of anti-
governmental rhetoric (Wills 71-122). Similarly, opponents of government have misinterpreted certain 
aspects of the Revolution. For instance, the romanticized portrayal of the minutemen (i.e. amateur 
soldiers) who freed the country of British suppression during the Revolution is inaccurate: unlike what 
is often claimed, these minutemen were not equipped with guns, as evidence suggests that there was a 
firearms shortage. The justification of the right to bear arms, as a means to protect the people against 
escalating government control, through this argument is therefore inaccurate (Wills 27-41). In sum, all 
“[t]hese misguided convictions, […] derive from the utopian belief that the American nation can 
flourish without the menacing mechanisms of state […] and that the federal government should 
properly be regarded as a dangerous cluster of despotic energies throbbing away beyond our view and 
control” (Ellis 419).  
By conceptualizing a typology of anti-governmental manifestations throughout three centuries 
of American politics, Wills demonstrates the immense quantity of distrust that is embedded in 
American political thinking. While continuing his moral crusade against the disapproval of 
government, he exposes the interconnection in distrust between, for instance, the Boston Tea Party of 
1773 and Timothy McVeigh, and between the National Rifle Association and hippies in the 1960’s 
(Wills 123-295). Although some of the parallels he assumes seem rather farfetched, because 
resemblance in some cases lies solely in some sort of broad view of negativity toward the government, 
the book is successful in illustrating the myriad distrust and cynicism in the US. 
 But distrust and its subcomponent, political cynicism, have not been the only features that 
dictate the socio-political thought of those who vote for Outsiderist candidates. Anti-intellectualism 
and anti-professionalism, sometimes linked with patriotism, influenced American public attitudes 
toward politics, too. Supporters of these sentiments ascertained that political leadership should rely on 
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the common man, rather than on those who are politicians by profession. The common man “[…] is an 
altogether adequate substitute for, if not actually more superior to, formal knowledge and expertise 
acquired in the schools”, because “[…] discipline of the heart […], religion and morality, are more 
reliable guides to life than an education […]” (Hofstadterb 19). One example from the comic literary 
genre that reflects on these ideals is Seba Smith’s The Life and Writings of Major Jack Downing. 
Originally published as a series of articles in a Maine newspaper, this influential satirical story sets out 
the path of Major Downing, a classic Yankee everyman, who leaves behind his country life to become 
the head of state in Washington and in the meanwhile reports on the peculiarities of US politics. 
Notwithstanding the book’s vast influence on the genre of American humoristic literature and the 
Yankee (vernacular) tradition, the seventy fictitious letters to and from Downing’s home reveal 
Smith’s criticism on popular democracy, partisanship and nationalism (Schroeder 214-5).  
 Moreover, the popularity of Jack, the ordinary American whose skills are only limited by his 
naïveté, and who serves as a comic metonym for the nation that similarly romanticizes the idea of 
overthrowing the government, illustrates to what extent anti-intellectualist and anti-professionalist 
ideals are embedded in American thinking. Consider, for one, the conversation that occurs when Jack 
accompanies President Jackson to Cambridge, where the latter will be appointed a Doctor of Law: 
  
 But says he [president Jackson], Major, I feel a little kind of streaked about it after all; 
for they [the Cambridge doctors] say they will go to talking to me in Latin, and although 
I studied it a little once, I don’t know any more about it now than the man in the moon. 
And how I can get along in that case I don’t know. I [Jack Downing] told him my way, 
when any body talked to me in a lingo that I didn’t understand, was jest to say nothing, 
but look as knowing as any of ‘em, and then they ginerally thought I knew a pesky sight 
than any of ‘em. At that the Gineral fetched me a slap on my shoulder, and haw hawed 
right out. Says he, Major Downing, you are the boy for me; I don’t know how I should get 
along in this world if it wasn’t for you. (Smithb 212-3). 
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This amusing quotation is also exemplary of the book’s many ordinary portrayals of Jack that 
romanticized the power of an everyman in Washington, and thus “[…] brought politics within the 
intellectual reach of a mass audience” (Rose 39). Moreover, the approval of Jack Downing as an 
American folk hero demonstrated the anti-intellectual and anti-professional sentiments in society, as 
he proved to many that the ordinary American, despite his political limitations, is as capable of 
engaging in politics as any professional or intellectual is; one might even argue that the book’s 
scepticism toward general politics implies that the ordinary American is even more capable. 
 Furthermore, the prevalence of anti-intellectualism – Hofstadter called it the “[…] national 
disrespect for mind […]” (Hofstadterb 3) – is not a recent phenomenon, but instead has been “[…] 
older than our national identity […]” (Hofstadterb 6). Likewise, Curti underscored this, as she provided 
an investigation that overlapped with Hofstadter’s on the origins of intellectualism’s unpopularity in 
American social thought. Both authors claim that the deep antipathy toward intellect is not derived 
from a distinctively American “[…] battle between the eggheads and the fatheads” (Hofstadterb 19), 
but instead can be traced back to the Evangelical/Protestant heritage that originated in Britain. Long 
before the New World originated, the role of intellectualism was debated within the European domain 
of Christianity, and was particularly related to egalitarianism. Is intellectualism not the opposite of a 
society where everyone is equal? Does it not inherently divide society into subgroups? In the wake of 
the Reformation, it was the Lutherans, Calvinists and Huguenots who opposed intellectualism on the 
European continent. Yet, while in Europe both sides in the debate coexisted in an equilibrium (which 
is not to say that ideological quarrels were absent), the balance in America has always leaned to the 
side of anti-intellectualism and egalitarianism. The general conception was that intellect should never 
preside in religion, and that it ought to be secondary to emotions and values. As a result, the character 
of the church in America contrasts with European Christianity: not professional clergymen and 
intellectual institutions, but loosely organized evangelical establishments, competition between 
various denominations and, first and foremost, spiritual equality (at least among all Christian 
Americans) defined American culture and church. In a similar fashion can these cultural differences 
between America and Europe be applied to political thought (Curti 3-11; Hofstadterb 20-3, 55-9).  
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 Although the Christian tradition laid down the fundament for American resistance against 
professionalism and intellectualism, three other social clusters have amplified the effect: politics itself, 
business and education. During the patrician era, political authority was in the hands of intellectuals. 
The unanimous praise that these intellectuals have been subjected to makes it all the more ironic that 
the intellectual reputation soon fell from grace among the public. This development can partly be 
ascribed to the popular democracy itself, but the biggest impact derived from the deprivation of moral 
standards in the realm of the political elite. To some extent, the attacks on Jefferson in 1800 
demonstrated this loss; the 1828 presidential race between Jackson and J.Q. Adams did even more so 
(Curti 205-24; Hofstadterb 145-60). Truly, Jackson’s attack on Adams had become “[…] the test case 
for the unsuitability of the intellectual temperament for political leadership […]” (Hofstadterb 157): 
Adams’s academic skills were generally considered inferior to Jackson’s ‘ordinary’ skills. The 
following poetic phrases articulate why anti-intellectual notions were preferred over their intellectual 
counterparts: 
 
That not to know of things remote  
From use, obscure and subtle, but to know 
That which before us lies in daily life, 
Is the prime wisdom.  
(in Republican General Committee 41). 
 
Likewise, business and education enhanced anti-intellectualism. In the wake of the American 
Revolution and later the industrialization, the then morally equipped political intellectuals consistently 
and continuously depicted corporate America as unethical, immoral and evil. Considering how both 
groups differed in interests and values this was not illogical, but it resulted in relations between 
corporations and the Washington intellectuals that were austere, if not antagonistic. The American 
business sector’s response was equally evident: it defied not only the image that business is some sort 
of public enemy, but also revolted against the intellectuals who inhabited the capitol city. The 
wealthiest men in America turned to anti-intellectualism, and although this business elite was small in 
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numbers, its influence on American society cannot be underestimated. As the industrialization 
accelerated with the effects trickling down to lower social classes, so did the anti-intellectualist 
disposition of the business elite (Curti 494-513; Hofstadterb 233-49).  
In a similar manner is anti-intellectualism fixed in the surroundings of education. This link 
between education and anti-intellectualism seems to be a contradictio in terminis. Yet, the anomaly 
between education and intellect is the result of mass accessibility to knowledge institutes in America, 
in combination with the popular ideal of education that regarded learning not as an end on its own (i.e. 
the intrinsic value of expanding one’s mind), but as a means in the pursuit of securing individual 
future political or economic interests in a system that offered everyone the same opportunities. From 
the outset, however, popular educational management proved incapable of withstanding the grave 
shortcomings that reality threw at it (e.g. underpayment for teachers, few facilities, neglect of gifted 
children). As a result, the quality of education declined and soon knowledge-seeking reached its nadir. 
On numerous occasions, intellectuals have reacted with attempts to revive the classic idea of education 
that emphasized knowledge par knowledge. The successes were mixed, but most attempts were either 
fruitless or negated, as the popular ideas about education were fully integrated in school systems. 
Because to this day America’s educational system adheres to the same popular notions (e.g. complete 
participation) that preserve a bar that is set low, the American intellectual is a species that faces 
extinction (Curti 564-87; Hofstadterb 299-322). Thus, the high degree to which the anti-intellectual 
wave that runs through America is embedded in various segments of society makes it unlikely that 
America as a whole will develop a positive appreciation of intellect, let alone of intellect within 
government.  
As a result of these sentiments, candidates have and have had good reasons to turn to 
Outsiderism. Outsiderism relies on an anti-governmental rhetoric that a) is shared with populism and 
republicanism, and that b) is built on sentiments like governmental distrust, political cynicism, anti-
intellectualism and anti-professionalism that dominate the public domain. Candidates conform to 
Outsiderism to inspire political confidence, as this strategy provides the optimal use of these socio-
cultural phenomena. Critics could argue that the social embracement of anti-aristocratic thinking 
would not necessarily make candidates adhere to these notions in their rhetoric as well. In fact, 
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candidates could ignore social sentiments and stay true to their own beliefs on how the political realm 
should be organized. While this claim is theoretically just, it is empirically not persuasive, as reality 
has demonstrated few candidates who did so. Instead, electoral competition compelled candidates time 
after time to base their rhetoric on strategic considerations of vote-maximization. Or, as Hofstadter 
paraphrased the Social Darwinist elements of Max Weber’s account of political behavior: “[…] the 
[political] man lives off ideas, not for them” (Hofstadterb 27). In a system that is characterized by 
survival of the fittest, candidates who do not conform to these competitive standards will simply not 
make it. Admittedly, the argument that a strategy presides over one’s own political convictions is a 
rather cynical one, but it is, as this thesis will help clarify, nevertheless a correct representation of 
political behavior during campaigns. To support this claim, the next section explores Rational Choice 
Theory to demonstrate why presidential candidates en masse have been drawn to the Outsiderist 
framework.  
 
ii. Rational Choice Theory 
 The appeal to Outsiderism can be well understood through a rationalist lens. As one of the 
many theories that aim to explain political behavior, Rational Choice Theory (RCT) constitutes an 
‘economical’ approach within the realist grounds of political science. The theory’s two main, 
characterizing assumptions are rationality and self-interest: “[…] people can be relied upon to act in 
ways which best secure their goals and that these goals reflect their self-interest” (Hindmoorb, 42). 
Additionally, RCT depends on what Hindmoor calls political individualism, insofar that the theory is 
solely practical and procedural: it does not reflect on how the world should be, but only on how the 
political structures in the world are established through rationality (Hindmoora 4). Scholars in RCT 
were not the firsts to adhere to such methodological rationality. In fact, their theory’s origins trace 
back to the ontological and metatheoretical concept of political realism, which claims that all states in 
the international arena are self-interested actors: states are power-seeking in order to deflect 
international threats. Yet, where political realism has been one of the principal fields of study in 
political science, RCT did not receive much attention until the 1960s. However, following an increase 
in attention of primarily American scholars like Robert Axelrod, Kenneth Arrow and Mancur Olson, 
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RCT became a mainstream theory within two decades (Hindmoorb 42-3). Although the initial growth 
has been halted, which made RCT a theory among many, it has succeeded in explaining a broad array 
of political and political-economic subjects. Its studies range from micro-level analyses of individuals, 
like voter behavior, to the macro-level governing institutions and state policies; truly, “[…] the logic 
of RCT is one that can be applied to just about any political situation […]” (Hindmoorb 59).  
 The applicability of RCT extends to the study of campaign strategies as well; or, as the title of 
Riker’s book suggests, it extends to the degree in which candidates possess “the art of political 
manipulation” (Rikerb): politicians and political parties are inherently vote-maximizing and will do 
anything within their means to win over the electorate. In recent years, Klumpp has presented an RCT-
oriented study in the light of campaigning. He employed an economic model to demonstrate the 
incentives that special interest groups provide for the campaign financing of primarily populist 
candidates (5-15). Similarly, Miller has written an article that accounted for a corresponding 
mathematical model of rational campaign behavior (Millerb 8-22) and Schuessler’s book was an 
extensive interpretation of the rationality of choice in American campaigns. Yet, these scholarly 
contributions were preceded by the influential underlying works of many RCT scholars, but of one 
man in particular: Anthony Downs. 
 As Hindmoor indicates, Downs has been of eminent value for the examination of the political 
behavior of parties in two-party systems, such as the US. Through a brilliantly simplistic model, 
Downs provided an essential basis for studying spatial (i.e. in-space) party competition and vote-
maximizing efforts. Undoubtedly, Downs’s greatest contribution to RCT has been the development of 
the median voter theorem. To illustrate this 
theorem, consider Figure 1, which 
demonstrates the relative position of parties 
(A, B) and the electorate on a left-right scale 
(x-axis) in relation to the degree of preference 
distribution (y-axis). The figure illustrates the 
Downsian claim that the electorate is 
Figure 1: voter preference on a left-right scale (0-100), with 
party A and B (based on Hindmoora 31). 
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allocated according to an approximate standard distribution: the vast majority of voters are moderates 
(near 50), whereas only a handful of people position themselves on the far sides of the political 
spectrum (near 0 and 100). Considering the hypothetical position of both parties in the figure, it is 
evident that no party has won a direct majority, as both cover a similar number of voters in the 
distribution. 
Yet, the more interesting element of Downs’s theorem is the a priori and rational party 
response to win over a larger segment of the electorate. Given that both A and B are self-interested 
actors, they will assume the most strategically beneficial position that can sway as many voters as 
possible to their side. In the case of Figure 1, these competitive considerations “[…] would give [B] an 
incentive to move immediately to the right of [A] so regaining majority support. But [A] could then 
move to the right of [B] and so on” (Hindmoora 27-8). This manoeuvring process is not continuous; 
eventually, position alterations will cease to provide strategic benefits and an equilibrium is reached in 
which both parties approximate the median (at 50), each covering their own respective halves of the 
spectrum, while simultaneously embracing nearly identical policies. In other words, because most 
voter preference is clustered near the median position, Downs’s theorem articulates that in a two-party 
and one-dimensional political space competition pushes parties to move closer to the median (as 
indicated by the arrows in the figure) and thus adopt policy positions accordingly. Evidence of the 
theorem can be found in multiple instances. For one, Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign team managed 
successfully to portray the Republican Party as exceptionally right wing and, consequently, secured 
the votes of those in the political centre and won the election. Likewise, Ronald Reagan’s presidential 
campaign of 1980 emphasized moderation over distinct conservatism (Fiorina 4). Unequivocally, 
Downs’s theorem has made a significant impact on RCT’s validity in relation to strategic 
campaigning. His theorem explained not only the salience of centered policy positions, but also 
provided unique, yet rational insights in how pressures, conditions, but mostly rational actors relate 
and interplay (Hindmoora 22-48). 
Yet, despite its explanatory merits, the model has been exposed to numerous forms of 
criticism as well. One of the authors who demonstrated its significant shortcomings is Stokes. He 
addresses four limitations, of which the first is the lack of multidimensionality. The complexities that 
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occur in a two-party system (or in any system, for that matter) cannot be fully comprehended in a one-
dimensional model. In particular, it is erroneous to unite the many different popular attitudes on 
political thinking one-dimensionally, simply because there is much more to these attitudes than a left-
to-right scale can embrace. To attest his claim, Stokes refers to multiple studies that found “[t]he 
relative independence of various attitude dimensions […]” (370): for example, while the Downsian 
model is quick to unite both a favorable attitude to social welfare and an internationalist approach to 
foreign policy on the left (i.e. liberal) side of the model, empirical research found that there is no 
statistical correlation between these two attitudes at all. Thus, the use of unidimensionality is a too 
simplified version of actual attitudinal distribution, which is inherently problematic for the model’s 
validity. Indeed, only through multidimensionality one can fully understand the different layers of 
electoral spatial positioning and the structures of party competition that derive from it (Stokes 370-1).  
A second flaw of the Downsian model is the assumption that political party competition 
occurs in a fixed structure. Space in an economic model can be fixed, as company sales and customer 
demands are invariable, ceteris paribus. But the extension of this claim to politics is inaccurate, 
considering the high degree of spatial variability within the system: both party and electoral 
dimensions fluctuate frequently. At one moment in time economic policies may determine one’s 
actions; at other times foreign concerns could do so. New dimensions are likely to occur in the 
political space as well. Yet, Downs’s assumption of a fixed structure of space fails to recognize these 
possibilities. Furthermore, multidimensionality suggests that a dimension either is or is not of 
influence to spatial political structure, but a more accurate account would differentiate dimensions by 
degree: dimensions, however limited their weight, can still be influential to some and should therefore 
not be neglected (Stokes 371-2). In addition, the third critique builds on the difficulties with political 
dimensions, too. Stokes argues that not all issues can be placed within the orders of dimensions. While 
issues like economic interventionism poses at least two alternatives for governmental action that is 
preferred by either the electorate or parties, other issues lack such alternatives. An example of that is 
corruption: every voter and every party opposes it and, consequently, there is no dimensionality in 
corruption. But this is where the problem arises: the lack of dimensionality does not mean that voters 
do not take corruption into account when deciding what party is preferential for them (Stokes 372-4). 
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In other words, “[t]he machinery of the spatial model will not work if the voters are simply reacting to 
the association of the parties with some goal or state or symbol, that is positively or negatively valued” 
(Stokes 373).  
Fourth and finally, Stokes criticizes the element of common reference. Whereas Downs 
assumes that the spatial scheme is applicable to the voters and parties simultaneously, empiricism puts 
question marks to the extent to which both groups perceive the political space similarly. The claim that 
producer and customer share an identical context may again withstand criticism in economic spheres, 
but, considering that the electorate is often faced with imperfect information as Downs himself admits, 
an extension to political realms of party and voter is far from justifiable. This closely links to the 
former point of critique on perception. “The behavior of voters depends not on where or whether the 
parties are on an ideological dimension but only on the electorate’s perception of these things” (Stokes 
375). Similarly, party leaders can perceive governmental policies and alternatives in ways that are 
different from those of the public and through cognitive frames that the public does not possess. 
Hence, differences may arise between the perceptions of reality of party space and the perceptions of 
that reality in the voters’s space, but this has not been incorporated in Downs’s theorem (Stokes 374-
6). 
 Yet, although Stokes claims that “[…] most spatial interpretations of party competition have a 
very poor fit with the evidence about how large-scale electorates and political leaders actually respond 
to politics” (368), one should realize that a model, despite its flaws, is merely an attempt to make 
political analysis more workable by streamlining highly complex sets of information. Stokes’s critical 
notes are justified at least to some extent, but incorporating them in a multidimensional and two-
spatial model is unmanageable and impractical for 
research purposes. It is for that reason that this 
thesis not on ideological convictions of spatial 
party-voter interactions but on methodological 
grounds accepts the assumptions of rationality, 
self-interest, space exogeneity and one-
Figure 2: voter preference on a left-right scale (0-100), with 
party A and B (based on Fiorina 2-7; Han and Brady 508).  
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dimensionality made in the Downsian model in order to investigate the part Outsiderism has played 
over time. 
In doing so, however, this thesis offers an alternative interpretation of Downs’s rational 
assumptions, which subsequently underscores why candidates en masse are drawn to the Outsiderist 
framework. Whereas Downs’s model advocates the median voter theorem, this thesis contests the 
assumption that the electorate is clustered around the median on the basis of qualitative empirical 
evidence. If empirical analyses of the American electorate have proven anything, it is that the 
electorate is and has been spatially divided into two separate factions, i.e. a moderate-left and a 
moderate-right faction, with corresponding parties on each half of the playing field. Graphically, the 
political divide is illustrated in Figure 2, with A and B as the respective party positions. Given that 
most voters cluster near the outskirts of the spectrum, an extreme campaign strategy such as 
Outsiderism shall consequently generate more voter mobilization than a moderate strategy would.  
An observant reader could argue that in spite of the shift in preference distribution Downs’s 
theorem can still be upheld, as one can logically argue that the rearrangement of the electorate as 
depicted in Figure 2 does not automatically mean that candidates will abandon the median position. 
Yet, while this is sustainable in theory, reality has suggested this is rarely the case. Fiorina notes that 
“[r]ather than attempt to move [the centrist voter] ‘off the fence’ or ‘swing’ her from one party to 
another, […] campaigners seem to be ignoring her” (3). Empiricism clarifies why that is the case: the 
neglect of the median voter in the US has resulted from candidates and parties that persistently 
emphasize more radical stances and thus position themselves in the vicinity of the corners of the 
continuum, as it is in these outskirts of the model that the biggest shares of voter preference are found 
(Fiorina 5-28; Hindmoora 31).
4
  
This notion of extreme positioning is in stark contrast with notions of “[p]olitical 
commentators in America [who] have frequently remarked upon the electoral significance of the 
                                                          
4 This claim must to a certain extent be put in perspective. Although candidates in most instances take extreme positions on 
issues, it is not unthinkable for candidates to approach issues they deem less important for election from a more moderate 
perspective. As candidates receive large amounts of electoral support on either side of the spectrum, candidates can get away 
with moving away from the borders of the left-right distribution, as long as they do so only occasionally, on issues of 
minimal importance and remain more tenacious on key issues. As chapter 5 will indicate, Van Buren’s response to financial 
malaise can be construed as such.  
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centre-ground” (Hindmoora 28). Yet, their categorical support of Downs’s median voter theorem 
seems unjust, as the Downsian claim that most American voters are political moderates defies the 
actual voter distribution across the political continuum, as the distribution is fairly radical. The US’s 
history of electoral polarization and party polarization indicates such radicalism amongst actors, too. 
Effectively, these insights have been translated into Figure 2, which thus amends Downs’s conjecture 
on the basis of the empirical absence of voters allocated around the median (Fiorina 2-4; Han and 
Brady 505-9).  
Moreover, the demand for the adaptation of Downs’s theorem has particularly snowballed 
since popular polarization grew even stronger from the late 1970’s onward. Han and Brady assert that 
in the wake of World War II US interparty relations were remarkably depolarized, motivated by a 
national sense of healing. But, with the impact of war fading away the House and Senate returned to a 
highly polarized understanding of political interactions in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Renewed 
polarization was instigated by party pressures, but also by the electoral defeats of many moderate 
legislators, causing them to be forced out and to be replaced by members who were ideologically more 
extreme (Han and Brady 505-7, 531). Along similar lines has the contemporary growth of mass 
polarization among the electorate been demonstrated. For one, Lee’s study of public ideology 
distribution during the elections between 1984 and 2008 makes a clear case for contemporary voter 
polarization (Lee 571-3, 582-90). 
Yet, conflicting principles and ideologies between the roughly sketched conservative and 
liberal perspectives are not modern phenomena. Polarization in American voter distribution has been 
part of a broader historical and institutional legacy, although the current spotlight on the matter often 
muddles this idea. It is not without reason that Han and Brady refer to polarization in the 1970’s as the 
return of antagonistic interparty relations that had dominated long before the War even commenced. 
They illustrate that voter support of parties has consistently over time been on either the left or right 
side of the political spectrum (507-9). Frymer makes the same claim more concrete by tracing back the 
roots of polarization to early partisan-based disparities on a number of issues that arose after the 
Constitution was implemented. Of the national issues that dominated the early nineteenth century 
particularly economic policy, civil rights and liberties, and federalism were factors that advanced 
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polarization between Jeffersonian-Republicans and Federalists and deeply divided the nation: what 
should the government’s role for economic progress be? What rights and liberties must be secured to 
be a free, if not the freest people? And how should governmental tasks be distributed between the 
national and states’s legislative branches (Frymer 336-7)?  
Similarly, the ideological struggle between the Democrats and Whigs in the 1830s and 1840s 
expressed the intensification of popular political divide and the continuousness of polarization in 
America (Layman et al. 85). In the remainder of the century, disputes over slavery, the Republican 
replacement of the Whig Party, and the rise of the People’s Party contributed to further polarization 
(Sundquist 39-119). This institutional devotion to polarization solidifies Downs’s claim of 
unidimensionality in each election, as “the characteristic that identifies a party realignment [is] the 
displacement of one conflict by another” (Sundquist 13). At the same time, however, it seems 
remarkable that Downs is not willing to admit the salience of polarization in his model and frantically 
clings to the salience of the middle through his median voter theorem. Admittedly, he refers to 
polarized cases as outliers, but he does not do justice to the plethora of empirical evidence that 
displays the century-long tradition of polarization.  
Moreover, in the past scholars have embarked upon the idea that in primary elections the 
behavior of candidates is more extreme than during general elections (e.g. Agranov; Burden; Hirano et 
al.; Hummelb). This is based on the idea that “[…] the voters in the two elections have different policy 
preferences” (Hummelb 1020): in the primaries they would seek a more radical candidate, while they 
would vote for a more moderate candidate in the general elections. Such voters resort to flip-flopping, 
as an effective strategy to win rounds. While Downs’s theorem certainly seems in line with the 
scholarly consensus of moderation in general elections, the evidence above is clear in its delineation of 
the historical path of extremism and polarization in American general elections, and thus rejects this 
consensus. Indeed, not only in primaries but also in general elections moderation has often been 
replaced by stances that approach the outskirts of the political dimension – a claim that Hummel at 
least in part acknowledges when he notes that “[…] general election candidates normally do not fully 
converge to the centre” (Hummelb 1020). Indeed, convergence around the median occurs so 
infrequently that it is rather the exception than the rule. 
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In reaction to this unjust consensus, scholars have underlined the need for an amended, neo-
Downsian model, as presented in Figure 2. This new model should accept the historical prevalence of 
institutionalized polarization in general elections and thus should diverge from an equilibrium around 
the median. To some extent, the sway toward the sides that polarization caused can be explained by 
voter uncertainty: voters do not know what the actions of politicians and parties once elected are going 
to be. Voters have imperfect information available (Berger et al. 228-31, 238-9), which results in 
forms of uncertainty for the public that Downs admitted as well: “[a]s soon as uncertainty appears, the 
clear path for taste structure to voting decisions becomes obscured by lack of knowledge” (83). But 
regardless of how polarization can be explained, the intensification of extreme political views and the 
bimodal concentrations of voters (i.e. a liberal and conservative concentration) has been supported 
with several economic and metric models (e.g. Berger et al.; Gerber and Lewis; Laver and Sergenti). 
 It is for the century-long persistence of social and political polarization in American political 
thinking that this thesis deviates from Downs’s median voter theorem and instead follows the line of 
argument of the scholars above. Although it incorporates a Downsian approach in terms of 
unidimensionality in a singular space with rationality determining action, it also integrates the element 
of polarization and, as a result, comes to a conclusion that is a polar opposite to Downs’s theorem: 
because of polarization, this thesis’s neo-Downsian model predicts divergence and bimodality at both 
edges of the spectrum, instead of Downsian convergence around the median. Moreover, this new 
model is highly suitable for the study of Outsiderism and underscores the relevance of Outsiderism as 
a widely used strategy: given that candidates behave rationally as vote-maximizing agencies – in casu, 
they target the voter blocks near the outskirts of the political space – the radical message of candidates, 
who employ an Outsiderist strategy as well as its corresponding emotional appeals, shows significant 
overlap with the radical viewpoints of voters. In other words, Outsiderism becomes the number one 
go-to rational response for candidates when voters abandon the political middle ground, because 
generally its notions and rhetoric are as extreme, emotional and radical as the viewpoints of voters to 
which it reacts. The congregation of candidate, party and voter in the two clusters of Figure 2 
underscores that Outsiderism as a strategy fits well in a rational model that emphasizes polarization. In 
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the light of this connection, the next chapter will set forth the methodology through which Outsiderism 
in this neo-Downsian model will be tested.  
 
3. Methodology           
Chapter 2 has described the core elements of Outsiderism. It has set out the rhetorical 
component, which builds on public sentiments, and the strategic component, which builds on 
rationality. With this theoretical framework, the salience of Outsiderism as a vote-maximizing strategy 
can be tested. To do so, this thesis investigates to what extent Jackson and Van Buren conformed to 
Outsiderism during their respective campaigns and chronologically evaluates the three presidential 
elections and campaigns of 1828, 1832, and 1836. The analysis per candidate consists of two parts: the 
first part scrutinizes the campaign rhetoric, while the second compares campaign rhetoric to the 
candidate’s policy once in office.  
To investigate Jackson’s and Van Buren’s use of Outsiderism during their campaigns, the first 
part of the analysis depends on one specific type of primary source: the campaign biographies of 
Jackson and Van Buren. These biographies, unlike most other sources, offer an inimitable opportunity 
to unravel what the campaign reflections and considerations were for deciding on campaign motives 
and strategies that helped to win over the electorate. Furthermore, with inventions such as the radio, 
TV and the internet still far ahead in the future, campaign biographies were one of the few vital tools 
for candidates to spread their message across the nation. On the basis of these biographies, the thesis 
employs a qualitative analysis, i.e. a “[…] nonnumerical examination and interpretation of 
observations, for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relations” (Babbie 
394). It reveals per candidate to what extent they made use of sentiments that induce populism, 
republicanism, anti-governmentalism and anti-elitism, which in turn could be linked to Outsiderism, as 
chapter 2 showed.  
Whether or not such a link to Outsiderism exists, depends on the second part of the analysis, 
as it questions if the adherence to these sentiments stems from an ideological conviction of the 
candidate or from strategic motivations that are inherent to Outsiderism. This step of the analysis is 
essential, because losing track of what is strategy or sincere belief would give rise to the erroneous 
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assumption that all, say, populist or republicanist notions are inherently Outsiderist (on the basis of 
Babbie 124-86). As the easiest way to unravel the hidden motives for positing ideas is impossible – 
that is, asking candidates what their motives are – this thesis resorts to a more limited approach. It 
searches for patterns and disparities between campaign narratives on the one hand and the policies of 
candidates once in office on the other, in order to differentiate between the true beliefs and the 
Outsiderist messages that are in fact strategically posited in the biographies. Moreover, these 
presidential policies have been selected on the basis of their national importance, because these are 
most clear in demonstrating how policy and campaign rhetoric relate.  
The second part of the analysis, thus, offers an opportunity to uncover to what extent 
biographies contain written discrepancies. If a candidate’s ideas and claims in his biography contradict 
each other, one is not inclined to qualify his ideas as genuine, but rather as strategic. Similarly, the 
approach can reveal the potential disparities between what candidates claim in their campaign 
biographies and what actions they undertake when in office: if a candidate’s ideas are translated into 
policy later on, one can interpret his former motivations as genuine, but if his policy contradicts the 
claims he made as candidate, one can logically deduce, ceteris paribus,
5
 that his motivations when 
running for president were more strategic than truthful. In other words, the degree to which 
discrepancies occur, either in written accounts or between words and actions, is an indication for why 
candidates said what they said and claimed what they claimed. 
Because of the importance of contrasting campaign rhetoric to policy for establishing the 
motivations behind that rhetoric, the biographies of the losing candidates are left out of the analysis; 
only a research of the winning candidates can clarify if they adhered to sentiments on the basis of 
genuine or strategic motivations during campaigns. Yet, the biographies of losing candidates are 
occasionally incorporated to serve a more supportive role where needed, and serve as one of the many 
variables that helped shape each campaign and election. What makes this qualitative research all the 
more interesting is that many would-be presidents outsourced the biographical writing. Although some 
candidates produced autobiographies, both Jackson and Van Buren outsourced the process to famous 
writers, colleagues and friends, who, in a sense, operated as what in contemporary politics would be 
                                                          
5 This logic holds up with all other things being equal, such as political action derived from negotiation. 
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referred to as ‘spin-doctors’: they helped contrive and present a message that would sway the audience 
to that specific candidate. An example of that is Senator John Henry Eaton writing the biography for 
Andrew Jackson.  
Finally, while this thesis’s qualitative approach to campaign biographies certainly has its 
merits, it also exposes a few pitfalls. One of the first questions that needs to be addressed is whether 
the results could be extended from the study sample (i.e. the three elections between 1828 and 1836) 
to strategic thinking in American elections in general. Although two electoral factors, partisanship and 
competitiveness, have changed little after the selected timeframe – if anything, they have become 
more important – it is unclear whether other factors have remained, changed or disappeared over time, 
which makes generalizations troublesome. The rather low study sample of three, compared to the 58 
presidential elections that have ever occurred in the 250-year-old history of American elections, 
similarly impedes the generalizability of this research, as it is not a representative sample of the 
collective of elections (on the basis of Manheim et al. 119-20).  
It is, however, to be expected that research duplication will result in the same outcomes, 
although the validity of this research greatly depends on a solid implementation of the second part of 
the analysis. One needs to be careful with extrapolating the results that come of it, given the lack of a 
precise distinction between genuine and strategic stimuli. Yet, the discrepancy-based interpretation of 
facts can help overcome methodological predicaments and allow for a conclusion on the use and 
development of Outsiderism as a campaign strategy in the early-competitive electoral arena in 
America. The analysis on Jackson’s use of Outsiderism is presented in chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains 
the analysis of Outsiderism in the case of Van Buren. 
 
4. The Age of Jackson          
i. The Campaigns of 1828 and 1832 
The presidential election of 1828 revolved around two candidates who had dominated the 
election of four years earlier as well: John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson. Adams obtained the 
presidency in 1824, although it was his direct opponent who technically had won, as he had received 
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the popular vote. Jackson polled 152.901 votes against Adams’s 114.023, which translated into an 
electoral vote of 99 for Jackson and 84 for Adams. The results of the 1824 election made Jackson the 
clear and obvious choice for the presidency, but having failed to win the absolute majority vote, (as 
two other candidates, Clay and Crawford, had won a combined total of 78 electoral votes) the 
presidential successor was to be selected by the House of Representatives from the three candidates 
with the highest electoral count, as the Constitution prescribed. It was Henry Clay who ended fourth, 
and was thus forced out of the race, but, ironically, he was the same man who as Speaker of the House 
had enjoyed so much power that he became a key actor in the oncoming process. Successfully, Clay 
wielded his influence to appoint Adams instead of Jackson, and soon “[…] the Washington scene 
erupted in rumors of intrigue, plots, deals, arrangements, and plain old vicious gossip, capital-style” 
(Reminia 85): his choice for Adams was not only motivated by his aversion of Jackson, but also by 
personal interests. Adams agreed to install Clay as Secretary of State once in office, to return the 
favor. Jackson’s supporters noted that the collaboration between Clay and Adams was highly immoral. 
Such corrupt bargains and patronage in the Senate were seen as direct violations of democratic 
principles. Moreover, Clay’s course of action raised the question of how a government could protect 
freedom nationwide if its members prove incapable of making decisions freely in their pursuit of 
personal desire. One particular jest expressed their reservations for Adams’s presidency: 
 
 Question: “Why is Adams on ticklish grounds?” 
 Answer: “Because he stands on slippery Clay.” 
 (Reminib 52) 
 
Despite protests, Adams was inaugurated as President of the United States on March 4, 1825. Old 
Hickory had to wait another four years to become president himself (Reminia 74-99). 
 Had the four candidates in the campaign of 1824 originated from one political party – the 
Democratic-Republican Party was the single party after the Federalist Party had vanished a decade 
earlier – the party split into two factions after the election of Adams. On one end of the political 
spectrum, the Democratic Party arose in the winter of 1826. This party, the harbinger of the 
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Jacksonian era, was a remnant of the protests against the Adams government that in their eyes 
promoted corruption and patronage. Instead, with voter restrictions diminishing, the party, set up by 
Calhoun, Buchanan, Ritchie and Van Buren, emphasized a popular government that promoted the will 
of the people on the basis of colonial doctrines, the Constitution and the Revolution. To strengthen 
their relations with the public, Democratic Congressmen decided to publicize newspapers. By 1828, 
more than 600 Democratic newspapers circulated throughout America, “[…] telling them [the 
American people] what they must do and how they must vote to save the Republic” (Reminib 49).  
Evidently, running a party and streamlining a campaign was costly, but the Democrats were 
inventive and came up with ways to raise the funds that were necessary to constantly bombard their 
hankering audience with campaign updates. As a result, the party was well-prepared to carry Jackson 
to the presidency in the next election of 1828. Party affiliates introduced slogans and songs in the 
campaign, of which the song “the Battle of New Orleans” is perhaps the most famous for its depiction 
of Jackson as a war hero. The campaign also created symbols, including hickory as a symbol for Old 
Hickory, poems, cartoons, posters, and even with barbecues the party stimulated support for Jackson. 
Indeed, “[f]rom the standpoint of the organization of publicity agencies and the distribution of political 
propaganda the campaign of 1828 was the most remarkable presidential campaign that had ever been 
waged” (Smitha 44). With this modification of campaigning, a new tradition was born (Reminib 35-52; 
Reminic 51-120; Kelsay 72-5). 
 In response to the Democratic Party’s popularity, which recently had led to a Democratic 
majority in the House and the Senate, the National-Republican Party arose as a counterweight. It 
primarily consisted of men who opposed the Jacksonian movement, like Adams, Clay and Webster. 
As a result, the party was commonly referred to as the Anti-Jacksonian Party. Politically, the party 
underscored the Hamiltonian principles of a strong federal government as a means for economic 
prosperity. Aware of the vast public support for the Democrats, Henry Clay developed the National-
Republican program: the government would build new roads, waterworks and highways to promote 
transportation and to incite economic growth. In 1828, Clay suggested a protective measure for the US 
economy through a plan that would introduce tariffs for foreign goods. It was meant to protect 
American manufacturers from unfair international competition on US soil. Moreover, he set up a plan 
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to establish a government-linked banking system. Yet, soon Clay and Webster realized that these plans 
would not break the Democrats’s momentum, all the more because their party had with the balding, 
short Adams a candidate who was not half as popular as the heroic opponent in the Democratic Party 
was. A change in tactics – from economic to noneconomic – was needed to regain political control 
(Reminib 53-66; Reminic 121-65).  
In anticipation of the oncoming election, the National-Republican Party, leaning more on 
Henry Clay than on President Adams, resorted to the strategy that in contemporary politics would be 
ascribed as mudslinging or slandering. Whereas President Adams claimed that this “[…] species of 
warfare […] has bore no resemblance to that dignified emulation, which alone should actuate 
honourable rivals for the people’s favour” (Adamsb 13), his party associates grasped every opportunity 
to disqualify Jackson as a suitable candidate for the presidency. Among other things, they offered a 
sharp critique on Jackson’s marriage to his wife, Rachel. They spoke of a marital scandal, because, 
allegedly, Rachel had been adulterous with Jackson whilst still married to her first husband, Lewis 
Robards, with whom she had had marital difficulties. While the political effect of this critique was 
limited in size, “[…] the Jacksons were deeply distressed by the public scrutiny of their private life” 
(Basch 890). Particularly Jackson was infuriated by the Robards affair, and would be for the years to 
come, as he was sure that the National-Republican campaign strategy had contributed to his wife’s 
illness and, eventually, to her death in December 1828 (Basch 890-6; Kelsay 77).  
 The National-Republican critiques on Jackson’s military life were of more political 
significance. In anticipation of the 1828 election, the Democratic Party had not shown restraint in 
depicting their candidate as an American folk hero, as the following ode from his biography illustrates: 
  
 Hail to the chief! who hied at war’s alarms, 
 To save our threaten’d land from hostile arms; 
 Preserv’d. protected by his gallant care, 
 Be his the grateful tribute of each fair: 
 With joyful triumph swell the choral lay –  
 Strew, strew with flow’rs the hero’s welcome way. 
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 Jackson, all hail! our country’s pride and boast, –  
 Whose mind’s a council, and his arm a host; 
 Welcome, blest chief! accept our grateful lays, 
 Unbidden homage, and spontaneous praise; 
 Remembrance, long, shall keep alive thy fame, 
 And future infants learn to lisp thy name. 
 (Eaton 398) 
 
The National-Republican Party strongly contested the suitability of any form of gratitude regarding 
Jackson’s military services. Particularly through so-called coffin handbills, anti-Jackson pamphlets 
containing information about executions he ordered while in the army, the party rejected the claim that 
Jackson was a hero who had protected his country’s freedom. With other pamphlets, National-
Republicans articulated that Jackson had an appetite for duelling, and that he was a cannibal as well. 
Moreover, they claimed that his actions against presumably hostile Indian tribes were in fact nothing 
more than the massacre of more than a thousand unarmed Indians (Kelsay 76-8; Taliaferro). The 
rhetorical question of one writer, Congressman Taliaferro, is perhaps one of the best illustrations of 
the high level of emotionality that the party’s strategy entailed: “[…] can you, my deluded 
countrymen, even think of making this horrible anthropophagian monster President of the United 
States?” (Taliaferro)  
Yet, the National-Republican Party was not the only party to use hostile tactics. “Adams was 
also the victim of much abuse and slander, although his life offered no such fertile field for the play of 
imagination” (Kelsay 78). The Democrats, nonetheless, repeatedly bombarded him with accusations of 
misuse of power, patronage and corrupt bargains, of which, in fact, little evidence existed. Perhaps his 
pact with Clay could be construed as corrupt, although the extent to which this was truly unethical is 
debatable, as the election of Adams by the House was in accordance with the Constitution. Moreover, 
it is not unthinkable that even without a bargain Clay would have rallied behind Adams, because he 
passionately disliked Jackson and Crawford’s health was declining. The selection of Clay as Secretary 
of State was therefore not illogical from Adams’s perspective (Kelsay 78). Regardless, Adams’s 
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response in reaction to accusations of corrupt bargaining was typically mild and professional. His 
office simply responded “[…] that there is nothing in the political sentiments of Mr. Adams, at 
variance with the purest and soundest principle of republicanism” (Adamsb 15).  
But regardless of whether such claims were truthful, the Democratic Party was successful in 
differentiating between what they described as the elitist, corrupt and anti-American National-
Republican Party and their own people-oriented party. Adams’s ill use of public funds was another 
point of critique. In an effort to reduce unnecessary governmental costs, the Senate adopted resolutions 
that exposed the wasteful behavior of Adams’s cabinet members. Adams’s own expenditures were 
also under scrutiny and received the label ‘fraudulent’ once records were found of the purchase of a 
pool table for in the White House. Yet, perhaps one of the most embellished stories was exposed when 
Adams had visited Russia. A New Hampshire newspaper published that Adams had offered his 
servant for sexual services to the Russian Tsar to reach his political objectives. The Democratic Party 
reacted outraged and the Russian cabinet filed a complaint, leaving Adams dispirited and desperate 
just prior to the 1828 election (Kelsay 78-80).  
 Contrary to the new, slandering campaign style of both parties, Jackson’s campaign biography 
depicted a vastly different approach. Had his opponent claimed in his biography that “[…] 
comparisons will be unavoidable, [as] it must become occasionally necessary to speak of the opposing 
pretentions of the several candidates” (Adamsb 13), Jackson’s biography is a polar opposite and only 
mentions Adams once. It never impeaches Adams and, thus, is not a negative collection of political 
fallacies, but instead offers a plainspoken and positive account of Jackson’s life and his military and 
moral achievements. Already in the opening passages, the author, Congressman John Henry Eaton, 
attempts to be modest by noting that “[h]is greatest regret […] is, that the events had not been 
portrayed by some masterly hand, that they might have been exhibited in a manner worthy of him who 
gave them their existence” (Eaton iv). Admittedly, this biography was written some years prior to the 
campaign of 1828, but the fact that the book reads not only like a recollection of the factual 
happenings of Jackson’s life, but also like a eulogy reveals the campaign motives behind Eaton’s 
writing.  
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 Furthermore, the biography of Jackson is characterized by an ostensible contradiction: it is an 
interesting combination of modesty and vicarious (i.e. campaign-induced) immodesty. On the one 
hand, Eaton aims to depict Jackson as a man of modest character and humble descent; on the other, 
when the author refers to Jackson as a man “[…] who, in moments of extreme difficulty, did not 
shrink from responsibility” (Eaton vi) the depiction is immodest and quite pretentious. While such a 
paradox is not illogical for a biography, as ghost-writers try to attribute as many qualities as possible 
to candidates, including humbleness, it is more interesting to note that this biography frequently 
displays elements of republicanism and populism. It asserts that already in his youth, Jackson’s mother 
read stories to him and his brothers of their heroic grandfather, “impressing it upon them, as their first 
duty, to expend their lives […] in defending and supporting the natural rights of man” (Eaton 10). At 
the age of fourteen, it was the same republican sense of liberty that made Jackson determined to join 
the army; it made him gallantly refuse British orders when he was captured later in his life; and it even 
made him disregard the orders of his own government years later, because a free people makes no 
compromises to freedom (Eaton 11, 24-5). Moreover, the book offers an extensive interpretation of the 
conflicts with Native American tribes. Numerous battles are described among the Indians and the 
American troops led by Major-General Jackson, but each in a similar emotional and populist fashion: 
the Indians are depicted as savages and hostile rebels, while Jackson and his men demonstrate great 
courage and patriotism to fight this threat against American freedom and sovereignty. Populism and 
republicanism are inherent components of Jackson’s view on Indians, which is exemplified by his 
remark that “[h]e who refuses to defend his rights, when called on by his government, deserves to be a 
slave – deserves to be punished by his government, as an enemy to his country – a friend to her foes” 
(Eaton 265). Based on Jackson’s conviction “[t]hat the civil was the paramount and supreme authority 
of the land” (Eaton 420), the author concludes that he is a true American and thus the best candidate to 
protect the American liberal principle (Eaton 431-42). 
 In addition to running as a republicanist and a war hero, to a certain extent does the biography 
seem to portray Jackson in resemblance with the aforementioned Major Jack Downing persona, in the 
sense that both are country men with little knowledge of Washington politics, but with a vast support 
of a public who sees them as one of theirs. Like Downing, Jackson grew up in a rural area and was 
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appreciated for using his folk wisdoms instead of purely professional skills during his political career. 
The biography demonstrates Jackson’s anti-professionalist and anti-intellectualist character by 
referring to his aversion of backroom politics and other forms of elitist behavior, so much so that early 
on in his life he resigns from his job in the Senate. Moreover, Jackson shares Downing’s bravery – the 
reader is reminded of that in every battle with the Indians – and although Jackson does not seem to 
possess a cunningness equal to Downing’s, both oppose a government that only looks after the 
benefits of a selected few (Eaton 9-27, 438-42). Finally, after an exhaustive campaign, Jackson won 
the election of 1828 and took office only four months after his wife’s passing, in March 1829. A 
number of concerns, primarily the Indian removal policy, the Nullification Crisis in South Carolina 
and the struggle for political reform, required his time during his first term and could perhaps help 
shed some light on the motives of Jackson’s republicanist and populist rhetoric. Yet, as these issues 
largely overlapped with Jackson’s second term in office, these issues will be scrutinized following the 
campaign of 1832. 
 
Had the elections of 1828 already given rise to two new political parties in America, in 
anticipation of the elections of 1832 a third party surfaced. This Anti-Masonic Party, a one-issue party 
that advocated against Freemasonry, nominated William Wirt for president, a former supporter of 
Adams who sympathized with Indian tribes. Although the party would be dissolved by the late 1830’s, 
it was in 1831 the first party to ever hold a national convention for selecting their candidate and 
running mate. This is not to say that the party has been solely responsible for the selection procedure 
of presidential nominees; already many politicians across the spectrum had discussed this procedure’s 
value for establishing a solid base of electoral support. Nonetheless, in the year after, both the 
National-Republican Party and the Democratic Party used the same methodology to decide on their 
own respective candidates. The former chose Clay as candidate, whereas incumbent President Jackson 
was again chosen to represent the Democrats. But while the nomination of Jackson was self-evident, 
the Democratic Party faced a bigger issue in the nomination of its running mate, which at that time 
was a separate nomination (James 306-10; Reminia 342-3; Reminib 141-3).  
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Already in the introduction it was mentioned how presidential control of the party became 
increasingly important in the late 1820’s and 1830’s and its relation to a dispute between President 
Jackson and his vice-president at the time, John Calhoun. Their relation exacerbated over banking 
issues, but, most notably, over the Eaton Affair. Within the party, Vice-President Calhoun had been 
considered the most likely successor of Jackson for four years later, but when his relation with Jackson 
became increasingly troublesome and Van Buren simultaneously became Secretary of State, Calhoun 
saw his future as succeeding president threatened. Calhoun and his wife, Floride, planned a scheme to 
diminish their rival’s chances. In a desperate attempt, they contrived a plan to have Van Buren 
removed from the cabinet as a result from a then hypothetical scandal. This scandal soon presented 
itself in the person of Peggy, John Eaton’s wife, the Secretary of War and writer of Jackson’s first 
biography. John and Floride Calhoun spread rumors about Peggy’s low moral standards. They 
exaggerated her past by making claims about her involvement with prostitution and, incited by 
Floride, the cabinet members’s wives and, following shortly, the heart of the political community in 
Washington refused to socialize with Peggy any longer. The Calhouns expected John Eaton to resign, 
who felt humiliated, along with the rest of the cabinet, including Van Buren, but the outcome was not 
as they had hoped. Jackson reacted furiously about the misuse of private business for political gain, as 
he conceived his own wife’s death as the consequence of similar political games and, with good 
reason, Jackson blamed Calhoun for the replacement of his entire cabinet (Reminia 203-16; Reminib 
84-6).  
What followed was a spiral of retaliation. Due to Jackson’s resentment of Calhoun, the latter 
saw his chances for the presidency reduced to zero and became remarkably reckless. Calhoun 
instigated the public debates on slavery, an issue that was particularly sensitive in the South. He 
became an active proponent of the right to nullify, which gave states the right to overrule federal law if 
they considered its legislation harmful to the state’s interests. He noted that if the federal government 
would refuse nullification, states had the right to secede from the Union. Calhoun’s stance on the 
matter made President Jackson even angrier, because he considered the social polarization that 
resulted from slavery and nullification as evident threats to the Union, but Calhoun persistently 
refused to protect the Union at the cost of state rights (Reminia 230-7; Reminib 86-92). 
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“Just how far Calhoun was prepared to go to demonstrate his independence – and in party 
terms, disloyalty – became evident shortly after Jackson re-formed his cabinet” (Reminib 92), the 
cabinet that succeeded the one that was destroyed by Calhoun’s hands. Jackson chose Van Buren for 
the position of ambassador to Great Britain, but the Senate had to confirm this appointment. The vote 
ended in a tie, presenting the vice-president with the final and decisive vote. Carelessly accepting the 
wrath of his party and especially of Jackson, Calhoun vengefully voted against the appointment. 
Angrily he exclaimed to his friend, Senator Benton of Missouri, the infamous, prophetical words: “[i]t 
will kill him [Van Buren], sir, kill him dead. He will never kick sir, never kick” (in Reminib 92). His 
friend, however, aware of the significance of his action, responded that Calhoun instead had made Van 
Buren Jackson’s new running mate. Indeed, Jackson nominated Van Buren, in part to get back at 
Calhoun, and in part because Van Buren’s capabilities were evident to Jackson. Finally, Van Buren’s 
endorsement came at the convention in 1832. Together with Jackson, he would represent the 
Democratic Party, whereas Calhoun remained behind, forced out and thus empty-handed. Van Buren 
had defeated Calhoun, but the defeat was mostly the result of Calhoun’s own anger-motivated choices 
(Latner 124-39; Reminia 237-47; Reminib 84-104). 
During the campaign of 1832, one particular issue 
dominated: the so-called Bank War. In fact, the ‘war’ would be so 
determinative for the outcome that some spoke of an election and a 
referendum on the future of the American banking system in one. 
Jackson’s anti-banking campaign had been on-going since 1829 
and during the campaign the debate on the possible withdrawal of 
governmental funds from the Bank intensified. Nicholas Biddle, 
the director of this Second Bank of the US, persuaded the Senate to 
renew the charter that President Madison had given the bank in 
1816, as the current charter was to expire in 1836, but President Jackson decided to veto the 
rechartering bill. In reaction, “[…] Biddle created an engine of propaganda” (James 361). He provided 
considerable financial funding to the National-Republicans’s campaign and in return Henry Clay 
accused Jackson of despotism. The caricature of Jackson as ‘King Andrew the First’ (see Figure 3), 
Figure 3: “King Andrew the First” 
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who is stepping on the Constitution while literally grasping onto his veto right, was spread throughout 
the country. Yet, the impact of Clay’s campaign move was minimal, as the Democratic Party was 
successful in depicting the veto as an act against corruption and elitism. The bank’s explicit support 
for Clay was a validation of such claims. Biddle and Clay’s efforts indeed proved fruitless against 
Jackson, who secured support of a vast majority of the electorate. Without any difficulty, incumbent 
President Jackson won the election by a landslide and effectively reaffirmed the cohesiveness of his 
party (James 350-67; Latner 164-92; Reminia 345-74). 
In terms of persuading his audience, Jackson had not issued a campaign biography as he had 
done in the 1828 campaign, nor did he need to, considering his immense popularity. The image that 
Jackson had been “[…] erecting himself in opposition to every design that came in collision with the 
duty he owed to the station he occupied” (Eaton vi) had never left the minds of his people. Yet, in 
1831, William Snelling, a writer and journalist, published an account of Jackson’s life that, according 
to Snelling himself, was neutral. Snelling’s biography was not a campaign biography at all, but still 
offered valuable insights and elaborations on Jackson’s views. Snelling took a vastly different 
approach, as he did not share Eaton’s campaign motive for writing: whereas Eaton’s biography of 
Jackson was notable for its immodesty and biased view, Snelling did little effort to hide his ambitions 
to write a more truthful and less biased account. He demonstrated this in his frank and open 
interpretation of Jackson’s habitual duelling urges, the Robards Affair, and in his depiction of the 
sixteen Indians who with Jackson’s knowledge were butchered (Snelling 10-1, 16-7, 56). Neither did 
Snelling aim to hide his criticism of Eaton’s biography. Already in the preface, he notes that “[t]he 
learned late secretary at war [i.e. Eaton] did his worst to his friend and patron in writing his life, or 
more properly his eulogium; but the president, mistaking an injury for a benefit, rewarded his ill-
advised labors in kind […]” (iii). Snelling continues: “[w]ere they [i.e. biographies like Eaton’s] to be 
regarded as specimens of American literature, or had their publication been delayed till now, we 
should dismiss them from our consideration, [because] they have aided to produce a delusion […]” 
(iii). Snelling’s approach is thus an attempt to rectify the misbeliefs regarding Jackson’s person and 
life. As conceding to complete presidential respect in writing “[…] would be equivalent to a surrender 
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of the liberty of thought, word and deed”, Snelling claims to “[…] proceed in a spirit of candor to 
weigh him [Jackson] in a moral balance” (iv) himself.  
Moreover, the result of Snelling’s quest for balance and impartiality is not merely represented 
in his criticism on Eaton’s book; his book also offered one of the few instances where anti-Jacksonian 
rhetoric can be interpreted as based upon an anti-republicanist rhetoric, rather than on the basis of 
slander and mudslinging. Consider the following paragraph: 
 
The Jackson newspapers were indefatigable in displaying the military services of their 
candidate. The battle of New Orleans was their principle theme. If it was asked, ‘Is 
Mr. Jackson a scholar?’ they answered, ‘he won the battle of New Orleans’. If it was 
said he had never been distinguished as a lawyer, legislator, statesman or politician, 
they answered ‘he won the battle of New Orleans’. […] In short, his conduct on that 
occasion was represented as the ne plus ultra of human perfection, as standing in the 
place of every qualification and as a sufficient atonement for every crime and error of 
which he had been, or of which human nature might have been capable. 
(Snelling 139)  
 
Not only does this section demonstrate that Jackson’s audience could be somewhat illogical in their 
reasoning; Snelling’s criticism to that reasoning also shows that the popular republicanist rhetoric of a 
war hero who protected American freedom was prone to criticism, or at least it demonstrated that it 
was not fully infallible. Likewise, this section could also be construed as anti-populist, because it 
criticizes the emotional appeals of the audience’s support of Jackson.  
Finally, Snelling concluded that he hoped that Jackson “[…] will be wise enough to decline a 
second election […]” (202). But his book also affirmed Jackson’s use of populism and republicanism, 
as, similar to Eaton, one can extract these sentiments both from Jackson’s personal remarks and his 
actions. Consider, for instance, the following display of Jackson: 
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Scarcely had the troops left Fort Strother twelve miles in the rear, when they were met 
by a convoy of the long expected commissaries’ stores, a sight of all others most 
unwelcome to them, though very delightful to their chief. He ordered them to return 
forthwith to Fort Strother, and was answered by a murmur that ran through the whole 
line. One company revolted at once, and were making off, when general Jackson 
intercepted them with a few followers, and threatened to fire upon them, if they should 
persist. He drove them back on the main body, where they communicated their feelings 
to their fellows. A whole brigade put themselves in an attitude to affect their escape by 
force and arms. General Jackson now made a signal of display of firmness and energy. 
He hurried to the front of the column with a musket in his hand, and declared he would 
shoot the first man who should advance. Two companies which still remained obedient, 
drew up behind him, and were commanded to enforce his orders. Thus braved, the 
courage of the troops gave way, – no one was willing to set the example of revolt, – and 
returning to order, they began their march back to Fort Strother.  
(Snelling 42)  
 
Thus, the fact that no one revolted and soldiers returned to battle is the result of Jackson’s bravery, 
which is typical for republicanist sentiments. Likewise, more military successes could be construed as 
republicanist in their claims on the defense of the nation. Indeed, “[m]ilitary reputation […] had given 
Mr. Jackson a greater popularity than any other candidate” (Snelling 138). Excerpts from his inaugural 
address of three years earlier reiterated some populist elements, too: Jackson claimed that to protect 
the government against its own powers governmental reform toward popular democracy is required 
(Snelling 161-2). In sum, one can conclude that Andrew Jackson strongly adhered to populism and 
republicanism, which helped him to persuade the electorate in 1832, as it had done in 1828. Yet, 
whether or not this indicates a case of Outsiderism depends on Jackson’s motivation to employ 
populism and republicanism; only when his motivations were strategic, rather than genuine, his 
campaign behavior can be construed as Outsiderist. Therefore, to determine his motivation, the next 
section investigates the degree of discrepancies between his campaign rhetoric and his policy.  
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ii. Policy and Practice under Jackson 
Three issues in particular required Jackson’s attention over the course of his two terms as 
president and aid in clarifying the motives for Jackson’s use of republicanism and populism. For one, 
the Indian removal policy had been an issue that dominated Jackson’s time in office. As the records of 
Jackson’s military actions against the Indians demonstrated, he had always assumed a considerable 
and rather oppressive role in Indian relations. The Creek War of 1813-1814, for example, “[…] was at 
once a war to punish the Indians […]” (Hollanda 5). But also in general terms, Jackson followed a 
harsh and, in many instances, inhumane Indian policy. His followers, nonetheless, approved this 
policy, because in their eyes, “[…] no person was more distinguished than Andrew Jackson, in 
defending the country against these predatory incursions of the savages, who continuously harassed 
the frontiers, and not infrequently approached the heart of the settlements […]” (Eaton 17). These 
sentiments dominated his presidency and by 1830, with frontier lines moving westward, President 
Jackson expressed the wish to move the Indian tribes, a total of roughly 60.000 people, from South-
Carolina, Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama to the lands west of the Mississippi river (Young 31). 
“What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to 
our extensive Republic, studded with […] towns and prosperous farms, embellished with all the 
improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12.000.000 happy 
people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization and religion?” (Jackson), the president 
asked the Congressmen in December of 1830. Although some scholars, like Prucha, have refused to 
accept that Jackson had “[…] a doctrinaire anti-Indian attitude” (Prucha 527), Eaton’s work 
demonstrates that Jackson’s view on Indians was negative and induced by the perceived threat they 
posed to freedom (e.g. Eaton 27-55, 148-188, 228-259). Thus, the claim that Jackson developed his 
Indian policy with the liberty and security of his people in mind is compelling.  
Moreover, “the situation of the United States vis-à-vis south-eastern tribes was superficially 
that of irresistible force and immovable object” (Young 34) and in an attempt to overcome this 
impasse Jackson proposed the Indian Removal Act of 1830. Contrary to what is widely assumed, this 
law was not of a compulsory nature; it only offered financial means to the president that could be 
utilized for land exchanges or for the payment of voluntary removals (Cave 1333). But, despite of the 
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absence of compulsory removal, the bill, nevertheless, “[…] brought the entire government into the 
process of expelling the southern Indians from their homeland” (Reminid 237), because while on paper 
the Removal Act permitted the Indians to stay in the south-eastern states, that option was in essence a 
hoax. Indians who refused to move away had to interchange their own laws and practices with the 
white men’s legislation. As Jackson understood that very few Indians would accept such a new way of 
living, most Indians were indeed removed to the millions of acres west of the Mississippi.  
Yet, the removal of Indians did not go as Jackson had hoped. Jackson’s own Indian policy, but 
especially the Removal Act, had made the Indian issue a federalist one and had thus taken it out of the 
hands where Indian policy originally belonged: the states. Moreover, it took years and years – and 
some seventy-odd extra treaties related to the removal – before it was completed. The budgeted 
$500.000 was exceeded by more than $65 million, although this does not compare to “[…] the cost in 
human lives and suffering […]” (Reminid 238) for those Indians who did not comply. Therefore, the 
Jacksonian Indian policy should be considered as a policy that only worked on paper. The bill’s 
intended preservation of the Indian way of living while simultaneously creating the new nation was 
overshadowed by its implementation that proved to be as inhumane and barbaric as the tribes were in 
the eyes of Jackson and his associates. Ironically, “[…] the greater glory of liberty [and self-
determination]” (Young 45) that formed the roots of Jackson’s republicanism certainly did not apply 
to the native occupants of the land.  
Yet, while President Jackson had been guilty of using a double standard, one cannot claim that 
his approach to the Indians changed when he became president. As Eaton’s biography clarifies, his 
actions toward the native tribes had always been motivated by sentiments of superiority against a 
perceived inferior and barbaric people that could harm the liberty and security of the new American 
people. This is indicated by the fact that already when he was general, Jackson did everything in his 
power to diminish the threat. As Prucha justly notes, Jackson’s “[…] dominant goal in the decades 
before he became President was to preserve the security and well-being of the United States […]” 
(527). During his presidency he continued along these lines and the large-scale removal of Indians 
exemplified that. As a result, there is no empirical evidence that suggests a discrepancy between 
Jackson’s attitude toward the Indians, as depicted in Eaton’s biography, and his attitude while in 
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office. This subsequently indicates that genuine, rather than strategic considerations were at the basis 
of Jackson’s stance during his campaign.6 
Moreover, the notion that his motivations were genuine is amplified by the fact that Jackson as 
president continued to express populist and republicanist rhetoric with regards to the Indian issue. He 
expressed the following in his state of the union address in 1830: 
 
The consequences of a speedy removal will be important to the United States […]. It 
puts an end to all possible danger of collision between the authorities of the General 
and State Governments on account of the Indians. It will place a dense and civilized 
population in large tracts of country now occupied by a few savages. By opening the 
whole territory between Tennessee on the north and Louisiana on the south to the 
settlement of the whites it will incalculably strengthen the south west frontier and 
render the adjacent States strong enough to repel future invasions without remote aid. 
(Jackson) 
 
This excerpt indicates the continuation of the populist and republicanist rhetoric during his presidency, 
as it emphasized the importance of protecting the nation and its people at the expense of Indians. It, 
thus, suggests that Jackson’s had no strategic motivation for saying what he said on the matter during 
the election. Yet, this conclusion needs to be somewhat nuanced, as it ignores the influence that the 
oncoming election of 1832 had, which posed new strategic considerations. As Jackson at the time 
aimed to run for re-election, the continuation of a populist and republicanist rhetoric within his Indian 
policy could have been employed for vote-maximizing purposes as well. It, therefore, does not a priori 
exclude Jackson’s use of Outsiderism in the light of slavery. 
A second concern that predominated Jackson’s years as president was the Nullification Crisis 
that resulted from an extensive issue over tariffs. It has already been mentioned that Henry Clay 
successfully proposed a law in Congress in 1824 to boost the American economy by protecting 
                                                          
6 This is not to say that Jackson, both as General and as President, was completely indifferent to the well-being of Indians 
(Prucha 531-2). He was not antipathetic, but the protection of the white man was his main goal. Moreover, Prucha clarifies 
that the removal of Indians was the only feasible option left in the 1830’s (534-6).  
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northern manufacturers from cheaper foreign imports. While the tariff of 1824 indeed helped the 
people in the northern states, Southerners faced its negative consequences. They exported their 
products, predominantly cotton, to the rest of the world against cheap rates, but without cheap access 
to worldly products themselves, they were now forced to buy the more expensive northern products. 
Moreover, Southerners asserted that the tariff was a deliberate scheme that would help advance one 
part of the country at the expense of another. When in 1828 import rates were raised once again, the 
South collectively responded furiously: they spoke of a ‘tariff of abominations’ and, secretly instigated 
by Calhoun, the right to nullify was put forth at the time.  
“[N]ullification maintained that the states each retained their independent sovereignty and that 
the Constitution was an agreement between them”, meaning that “[i]f a majority imposed an 
unconstitutional law on a single region, a state could ‘nullify’ the federal law within its borders” (Yoo 
563-4). Additionally, Calhoun claimed that if a state’s veto was not accepted, the state had the right to 
secede, to leave the Union. Secessionists rallied throughout the entire South, but were particular 
forceful in South-Carolina. Following the election of 1832, Jackson drafted a bill that would lessen 
tensions by reducing tariff rates, but within a month South-Carolina had vetoed the bill, unhappy with 
Jackson’s ill-proposed compromises, and openly discussed the option of leaving the Union if the 
federal government should override their decision. Jackson, who had no intention to accept a secession 
of the state, prepared for a civil war and, likewise, the anti-tariff crusade in South-Carolina turned 
more militant. Finally, “Jackson’s willingness to make a deal on the tariff, combined with a display of 
indomitable will on the constitutional issue, produced a political solution” (Yoo 572). A military 
standoff was prevented and Jackson successfully kept the Union together – many historians agree that 
it was his greatest achievement as president (e.g. Latner 140-63; Yoo 562-73). 
It is hard to determine whether Jackson’s approach to the Nullification Crisis is consistent 
with his previous remarks on state rights and liberty, because that depends strongly on Jackson’s 
interpretation of ‘freedom and liberty’; one needs to clarify whether Jackson translated freedom, an 
essential component of republicanism and populism, either as the state’s right to decide freely on 
nullification and secession or as the majoritarian democratic principle. According to Yoo, Jackson’s 
perception of freedom did not maintain state rights as the “[…] guiding principle of democracy”: 
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“[a]lthough he firmly believed that the powers of the federal government were limited and that the 
states were to exercise all others not granted, Jackson believed even more so in the permanency of the 
Union” (Yoo 565). As Jackson admittedly noted, secession and disunion were worst-case scenarios for 
him. He reiterated this at a dinner, where he said: “[o]ur Union: it must be preserved” (in James 235), 
while fixating his eyes on Calhoun. That Calhoun’s definition of freedom had more to do with state 
rights than with majoritarian democracy was clarified by his immediate response to Jackson: “[t]he 
Union, next to our liberty most dear” (in James 235). Jackson, on the other hand, emphasized that 
liberty meant that majoritarian decisions taken by representatives, who were elected on the basis of a 
free and fair democratic process, should not be overridden or hindered by a minority of states (Yoo 
562-5). Indeed, in the eyes of Jackson and every other centralist, even a military intervention of Union 
troops in South-Carolina would have been justified (James 318-21).  
But is there a discrepancy between Jackson’s policy toward nullification and his previous 
claims on the matter? The problem here is that Eaton’s biography does not explicitly deal with the 
right to nullify or to secede, because the tariffs issue had not surfaced when the book was published. 
Moreover, the biography does not reveal his sentiments toward federal and state rights. Yet, other 
sources confirm that to some extent his actions during the Nullification Crisis indeed can be viewed as 
incongruent with his words, because Jackson’s unremittingly federalist-oriented response during the 
Crisis was a divergence from times when he had favored state rights over federalism. In 1796, he said 
that “the moment, the Sovereignty of the Individual States, is overwhelmed by the General 
Government, we may bid adieu to our freedom […]” (in Reminia 32-3) and in 1824, he noted that “[t]o 
keep the sovereignty of the States and the general govt properly and harmoniously poised, is the pivot 
on which must rest the freedom and happiness of this Country” (in Reminia 31). Now, during the 
Nullification Crisis, Jackson drifted away from the conservative doctrine that he was taught as a child 
and that warned against the threat of an all-consuming general government that is susceptible to 
corruption. This is not to say that in prior years Jackson had been a proponent of specifically the right 
to nullify and the right to secede, but he had been a “[…] states’-rights advocate of the Jeffersonian 
school”, who feared centralized power and “[…] regarded the Constitution as a limiting rather than 
enabling document” (in Reminia 35).  
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Remini remarked that during his years in office, some twenty-odd years later, Jackson was 
forced to abandon these Jeffersonian ideals for a more pragmatic, centralist approach in which state 
power was increasingly restricted. Yet, it is debatable to what extent we can truly speak of a broad 
incongruity between his former sentiments and his actions during the Nullification Crisis, because of a 
number of reasons. First, neither the biography nor the additional sources reveal whether Jackson had 
in the past perceived the right to nullify and secede as specific state powers. Second, although it is 
clear that within a couple of decades Jackson turned from anti-centralist to centralist (Reminia 30-8), it 
is questionable whether his conversion was motivated by campaign goals or by incentives on how to 
reach certain political ends. Third, Jackson had always been a forerunner of the majority rule principle 
as well, and his actions against the nullification doctrine demonstrated precisely that. Moreover, 
President Jackson claimed to defend state rights and said in 1825: “[t]he great mass of legislation 
relating to our internal affairs was intended to be left where the Federal Convention found it – in the 
State governments. […] This is not the reflection of a day, but belongs to the most deeply rooted 
convictions of my mind” (in Reminia 226). When the Nullification Crisis took place, however, these 
convictions proved less deep-rooted, as he aimed to override state legitimacy in terms of deciding on 
these internal affairs by drawing the issue to the realm of the federal government. Nullification proved 
that his state rights stance was replaced by a centralist approach, as was the populist and republicanist 
rhetoric that in his previous campaign had accompanied his state rights message. Therefore, in the face 
of many reservations, evidence seems to suggest that there is indeed a discrepancy between the 
convictions he claimed to have with regards to state rights during the campaign and his opposition to 
South-Carolinian nullification, which subsequently is an indication for Jackson’s use of Outsiderism.  
A final issue dominating the Jackson administrations involved the efforts to achieve political 
reform, which ultimately proved to be the genesis of Jacksonian Democracy. The creation of the 
Democratic Party in anticipation of the 1828 election had been responsible for electoral competition 
and the subsequent “[…] rise of the common man […]” (Reminic 203) as an active member of party 
politics, but the rise of popular political involvement further amplified under Jackson’s guard. 
Moreover, not only did both the Indian removal policy and his reaction to the Nullification Crisis 
display his intentions for a popular reform that promoted liberty (Reminia 200-1, 380-2), but after 
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eight years in office he had indeed “[…] encompassed some of the most important changes in 
American political history” and transformed the nation “[…] from an elitist republic into a 
representative democracy” (Reminib 174). This transformation came about in numerous ways. Most 
notably, Jackson reinterpreted the presidential function in defense of the American people: he 
explicitly served as their leader and acted on behalf of their interests. But the fortification of the 
presidency also had a large impact on the political system. Jackson became responsible for national 
policy and simultaneously used his presidential powers to replace the traditional political setting that 
induced corruption, privilege and deference with a people-oriented rule that was founded upon the 
Jeffersonian principles of a “[…] limited government, individual initiative, and moral constraint […]” 
(Latner 86). As a result, Jackson changed the American presidency into a more powerful agency 
(Reminib 174-85). 
In addition, the institutionalization of the rotation in office system meant that “Andrew 
Jackson was intimately identified with the full flowering of American democracy” (Sellers 615). 
Jackson wrote that “rotation in office will perpetuate our liberty” (in Reminia 183), because it would 
discourage elitism among officials who so often believed that they were entitled to their functions. 
Rotation in office granted Jackson the option to expel the men who corrupted government and, as it 
effectively meant that the ‘rascals’ were thrown out, Jackson used the mandate the American people 
had given him to decide on new political appointments. Although the electorate was already during the 
campaign of 1828 captivated by Jackson’s intentions for popular reform, rotation in office also led to 
an unintentional and unfavorable consequence: it engendered the spoils system – a system in which 
political functions are assigned on the basis of patronage and partisanship – that to this day is in effect. 
The spoils system gravely undermined what rotation in office was designed to do in the aftermath of 
Jackson’s tenures: instead of combatting corruption and inefficiency, it promoted partisanship 
inadvertently (Reminia 181-90). 
Although Eaton’s biography of Jackson does not reflect on how he would attempt to redesign 
the general government once in office, the infrequency with which President Jackson used his 
executive power to effectuate rotation could indicate a possible discrepancy. While the acceptance of 
rotation in office as a democratic and libertarian doctrine soon advanced, its effects were rather 
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limited. Remini justly notes that “[…] it is extraordinary how few dismissals actually took place” 
(Reminia 191): a mere 919 of 10093 government officials were via rotation removed on the basis of 
immoral practices. To be fair, a more nuanced disposition is needed to explain why this number is 
relatively low. First, the implementation of rotation in office was in Jackson’s eyes not a licence to 
dismiss state employees in a quasi-random (or partisan) fashion. Instead, Jackson only authorized 
resignations when there was evidence of illicit activity, which on its turn slowed down the process of 
governmental ‘cleansing’. Third, in reaction to the embezzlements that his cabinet exposed, Jackson 
requested Congress to formulate new laws to tackle corruption and he ordered extra investigations to 
expose the ‘rats’ as well, which both decreased the need for further rotation (Reminia 186-9).  
Yet, while these aspects seem to suggest that his campaign rhetoric of reform was truthful, 
some essential components undermine the validity of these claims. First, one cannot exclude that the 
translation of his rhetoric into his policy was the result of strategic motivations for the next election, in 
1832. The second component relates to the content of his reform policy: one can construe the 
aforementioned low numbers of dismissal as a factual discrepancy, because Jackson was, and had 
always been an intrinsic and old-fashioned conservative. Jackson had both the power and the 
opportunity to remove many more who had violated ethics, including Henry Clay and John Quincy 
Adams, “[b]ut once the idea of rotation as a democratic principle caught on, Jackson could afford to 
keep things operating pretty much as before” (Reminia 192). Indeed, Jackson’s notion that the 
implementation of his reform was inferior to the ideal of reform itself indicates that some of his reform 
efforts were part of a rhetoric that was founded on Outsiderist principles. It suggests that he only 
employed populism and republicanism strategically, as these reform ideals were popular among 
voters. Indeed, with the absence of a full-scale implementation of reform, his traditionalist political 
views had superseded his rhetoric of reform.  
In sum, Jackson’s campaign biography has demonstrated the high degree with which he used 
populist and republicanist rhetoric during his campaigns. The account of his life, written by Eaton, 
read like a eulogy and demonstrated how an ordinary American became a war hero and, subsequently, 
a politician that was loved by many for his devotion to the nation in an anti-elitist and anti-
professionalist fashion. The analysis of his policy on the Indian removal, nullification and political 
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reform point out that his adherence to populist and republicanist values during the elections was 
strategic. This strategic use of populism and republicanism indicates that Jackson has employed 
Outsiderism during the campaigns to garner electoral support, although one must admit that this 
conclusion is to some extent negated by Jackson’s consistency on the Indian matter. Yet, given that a) 
the presence of populist and republicanist rhetoric in his Indian policy could have been the result of 
strategic consideration for the next election, and b) the issues of nullification and political reform 
demonstrate the strategic use of a populist and republicanist rhetoric, one can conclude that Jackson 
has employed Outsiderism. In the end, his Outsiderist strategy was so effective that many observed 
Martin Van Buren’s success in the next election in 1836 as Jackson’s third victory (Reminib 179). On 
the same day that Van Buren took over the presidency, Jackson reflected on his own presidency. When 
his friends asked if he had any regrets about his time in office, he mentioned only two: “I regret that I 
was unable to shoot Henry Clay or to hang John C. Calhoun”, he said (Zuchora-Walske 7). 
 
5. King Andrew’s Legacy: Van Buren and the Whigs     
i. The Campaign of 1836 
Unlike the prior elections, the struggle for the presidency in 1836 has received little scholarly 
attention. This election is often merely remembered as a contest between Jackson’s successor, Van 
Buren, and an opposition that consisted of multiple candidates within a singular party. Other than that, 
scholars generally have treated the 1836 election as a trivial and subordinate one that is caught in 
between the extensively researched Jacksonian politics and the log cabin campaign of the 1840 
election. But, as others correctly have asserted, such a treatment does not accurately reflect the 
election’s historical relevance. While it is true that the election of 1836 “[…] bore characteristics of 
both tradition and modernity” (Shade 459), modernity vastly overshadowed tradition, as the election 
demonstrated the reformation of the American party system (McCormick 47-8; Shade 459-60). It 
reflected a new ‘constitutional order’, in which the winning candidate “[…] was elected not as the 
champion of some set of policy positions but – in defiance of the Madisonian constitutional design – 
as the candidate of a mass political party” (Leonard 222).  
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Whereas the Democratic Party had flourished under Jackson’s rule, by 1833 little was left of 
its opponent’s cohesiveness. The National-Republican Party had for a second time suffered from Old 
Hickory’s popularity, had lost the election in the previous year and was torn over the issue of 
nullification. To wash away “[…] the National-Republican heritage of defeat” (Carroll 118), party 
officials, led by Daniel Webster, decided to create a new party: they forged a strong coalition between 
National-Republicans, Anti-Masons, Anti-Jacksonians, rebelling Democrats like Calhoun, and 
nullifier – the latter group had been critical of Jackson because of his federalist disposition during the 
Nullification Crisis. The new party was established within the first months of 1834 as the Whig Party 
– a name that is prone to several interpretations, but most likely is a direct referral to the American 
Whigs of 1776, who rebelled against the British and who had displayed a patriotic doctrine that the 
new party would adhere to as well. But while the ideological core of the party was obvious, it halted 
on a managerial level and it took the party until the campaign of 1836 to formally organize (Brown 5; 
Carroll 118-24). 
With the oncoming election in mind, the primary concern of the Whigs was the selection of 
the party’s presidential candidate. Doing so was, however, easier said than done. While the party was 
gaining popularity on a national scale, local and state elections had resulted in a number of defeats for 
Whigs candidates. Inspired by the wish to prevent a similar defeat on the national platform, the party 
had to be careful, elaborate and precise in the selection of a national candidate. It needed someone 
who could garner support nationwide, but finding a suitable candidate who could unite the party was 
hard. This process was even more difficult because of the “[…] discouraging absence of [party] 
principles” (Carroll 127), which had been the result of the political diversity among members of the 
Whig Party. Not only had the Democratic Party demonstrated in the election of 1832 that such 
principles were foundational for electoral success in a partisan system, but the absence of overarching 
principles among the Whigs also obstructed candidate-voter relations. How could one select a 
candidate if one does not know whose ideas are the best reflection of, or most beneficial to, the party? 
And, vice versa, how can a candidate appeal to an audience if he lacks a set of robust party ideals that 
have the ability to unite?  
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While in theory a shortage of shared party principles can be overcome, in reality Whig 
candidates remained faced with this barrier. Failing to find a candidate who could represent the 
collective, different regions decided to nominate their own candidate for the presidency. The Southern 
states nominated judge and former Democrat Hugh White, while northern nationalist Whigs chose 
Webster as their representative. The western states nominated William H. Harrison instead of Henry 
Clay, as the latter had been too involved with both Calhoun and the tariff of abominations. Although 
Webster enjoyed the support of most of the Whig newspapers, it was initially Harrison who saw his 
popularity skyrocketing: the reasoning went that Harrison, the war hero of Tippecanoe, surely had the 
best chances to defeat Van Buren, the heir of the hero of New Orleans. Yet, with electoral groups and 
regional newspapers each continuing to support their own candidate, an impasse was reached and 
officials were not willing to set aside their political and regional preferences to create party unity. 
Therefore, the party was forced to nominate a plurality of candidates: Webster and Harrison 
represented their respective regions, while White represented the nullifiers in the South and Mangum 
the North-Carolinians (Carroll 127-48). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the internal divisions and conflicts demonstrated that the 
multiple candidacy was involuntary and unplanned. “In innumerable accounts […] it is asserted that 
the Whig party adopted the strategy of running regional favorites in opposition to Van Buren with the 
hope of throwing the final choice into the House of Representatives” (McCormick 47), as had 
happened in 1825. But there was no countrywide Whig strategy, simply because a single, national 
party apparatus that could construct such a strategy did not exist. Instead, regional interpretations of 
that party existed, which caused in-party competition between the different candidates. This impeded 
the party’s ability to create a united and national agency (Carroll 123-70; McCormick 47-9, 68-70). 
But even if the argument of a multi-candidate Whig strategy were to survive, the eventual electoral 
loss in 1836 illustrated that the Whig Party, as a formal and organized platform with a shared set of 
ideas, was still in its infancy. Van Buren won, with a total of 170 electoral votes (compared to the 124 
of all the Whig candidates combined) and, although not by a landslide, Van Buren was elected 
president without interference of the House (McCormick 68).  
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The Whigs had failed to win the presidential race, but the preceding campaign had also 
exposed the first cracks in the seemingly Democratic monopoly on the presidency. As in most 
previous campaigns, the issue of slavery had reached the political podium, but, unlike former 
elections, the slavery question, roughly between northern abolitionists and the Southern slave states, 
persisted this time. Indeed, during the election “[…] abolition […] became a much more important 
issue than his [Van Buren’s] stand on the tariff, internal improvements, [and] the Bank” (Niven 386). 
Had the New Yorker of Dutch descent in the past always been avoiding this sensitive subject, being a 
passive, but also a nuanced and compromising politician, he now had to rethink “[…] how [he] could 
create a position on the subject that southern slaveholders and white northerners alike would accept” 
(Shade 465), as noncommittalism was in 1836 no longer feasible. “Van Buren’s biggest problem was 
not the small group of abolitionists in his midst at home, but the important and vocal group of 
Calhounites and southern Whigs […] (Shade 465): they “[…] sooner or later […] would seize upon 
slavery as a means of dividing the Democrats in swing states […]” (Niven 387). He therefore decided 
to make an audacious move on what would be the most important campaign issue. 
In the past Van Buren had dismissed slavery by asserting that “[t]he subject is […] exclusively 
under the control of the state governments” (in Hollandb 345) – he was generally more committed to 
state rights than Jackson had been. But with tensions rising, Van Buren now decidedly adopted an 
explicit anti-abolitionist and pro-slavery attitude. He presumed that the end of slavery would mean the 
end of the Union, and like Jackson, Van Buren sought to prevent that (Shade 465-73). In his inaugural 
address, he reiterated the point of view he had assumed during the campaign: “I must go into the 
Presidential chair the inflexible and uncompromising opponent of every attempt on the part of 
Congress to abolish slavery […] against the wishes of the slaveholding States, and also with the 
determination equally decided to resist the slightest interference with it in the States where it exists” 
(Van Burena). In reaction, northern abolitionists warned against Van Buren: 
 
The time will soon arrive for the choice on electors of President […] – and it may 
depend upon the votes given by the abolitionists, which ticket, at this election, shall 
prevail. […] In regard to the election of President and members of Congress, it is 
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important that the views of the candidates, in relation to the abolition of slavery […] 
should be distinctly ascertained – and that no candidate should receive the votes of 
abolitionists, who is opposed to them […]. Mr. Van Buren has come out decidedly 
against them […]. [N]othing can be expected from him, should he be elected, but 
continued opposition. […] In Mr. Van Buren, [we] have a determined opponent at 
every step, and can expect from him nothing but opposition, and perhaps 
discomfiture. Under these circumstances, it seems to me, that it would be nothing 
short of madness – a complete abandonment of their cause – for abolitionists to 
support him. 
(An Abolitionist) 
 
While Van Buren’s opinion, supported by his appeal to state rights, certainly seemed to indicate some 
sort of southern favoritism that could impossibly have benefited in-party relations, Southerners 
remained on their part reluctant to support the Democratic candidate. Four years earlier, southern 
Democrats had only endorsed Van Buren’s vice-presidency because he shared a ticket with Jackson, 
but they now had few incentives to vote for Van Buren. Therefore, in an effort to prevent electoral 
loss, Jackson explicitly rallied behind Van Buren as the Democratic candidate. In turn, Southerners, 
instigated by the Whigs, were critical of this patronage. A critical biography of Van Buren, written by 
David Crockett, an American folk hero and a former National-Republican, illustrated these negative 
sentiments regarding Jackson’s support of Van Buren: “[…] if it is a good principle as between 
President Jackson and Van Buren, it is equally so as between all future presidents and their pets, and 
ought to be carried into a law.” This “[…] would change the whole character of the government; and 
instead of a republic, it would be a right-down monarchy, and nothing else […]” (Crockett 5).  
In addition, according to Crockett, the only basis for Jackson’s endorsement of Van Buren was 
their friendship – a friendship that was induced by Jackson’s difficult relation with Calhoun (12). In 
Crockett’s eyes, Van Buren’s lack of the required qualifications for the presidency proved this. He 
called Van Buren a “[…] secret, sly, selfish, cold, calculating, distrustful, treacherous […] little man, 
without talents, and what is worse, without honesty, […] who is a federalist to-day, a republican to-
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morrow, and a hypocrite always” (Crockett 13, 18). The majority of the public, particularly in the 
South, indeed shared this image of Van Buren to a large extent: he was a weak “anti-hero” (Curtis 
255) who lacked the confrontational approach that Southerners appreciated. Yet, the greatest objection 
to Van Buren among Southerners was his perceived incapability to halt the abolitionist movement. 
Consequently, Van Buren’s support was declining in rural areas, while the popularity of Whig 
candidates was growing. For example, former Democrat Hugh White gained more and more 
popularity in Tennessee, his home state and as a result, managed to take the state at the election of 
1836 (Atkins 28-9; Curtis 255-7; Moore 335-41; Niven 393-6).  
Although this success was too regional (and thus too marginal) to sway the national political 
pendulum to the Whigs, the previously impermeable ceiling of southern Democratic support had 
started cracking. As the Whigs failed to put forth an intelligible, national party program themselves in 
the campaign of 1836, they resorted to the negative campaigning style that had dominated the previous 
elections. Aware of the fact that Van Buren was generally disliked by the electorate, the Whigs “[…] 
made Van Buren the issue, not what he stood for, but the man himself, his appearance, his political 
style, his alleged lack of scruples, even his parentage was called into question” (Niven 401). Yet, 
while attacks on Van Buren were indeed personal and harsh at times, they were relatively mild in 
comparison to the attacks on Van Buren’s vice-president, Richard Johnson. Whigs accused him of 
being a “practical amalgamator” (Brown 5), because the white Kentuckian had regularly been sexually 
intimate with black women. The so-called ‘amalgamation of races’ was a sensitive social subject in 
many regions at the time, but the case of Johnson made it political.  
To a limited extent was Johnson criticized by his fellow (southern) party members at the 1835 
Democratic convention for immoral practices. Yet, more problematic was the critique of the Whigs, 
who saw in Johnson’s personal life the perfect opportunity to discredit the Democratic Party. 
Particularly the conservative branch of the Whig Party expressed its concerns “[…] with the 
maintenance of hierarchical social distinctions in a mass democracy […]” (Brown 7) and, therefore, 
emphasized during the campaign that Johnson’s behavior was a threat to America’s social classes and 
public morale (Brown 5-11). The reactions of Johnson and Van Buren, calling the Whigs behind these 
accusations snobbish and pretentious, were only countered by the claim “[…] that Johnson’s 
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nomination was a cynical ploy to attract the votes of abolitionists” (Brown 8). In the end, however, it 
was neither the issue of slavery nor Van Buren’s personality or popularity that secured the victory for 
the Democrats; it was the element of party in Van Buren’s strategy that helped obtain electoral 
success. Van Buren had established such a strong party and campaign organization that the 
Democratic Party had become the first mass political party in the world. It was thus the reshaping of 
party politics that pushed the outcome in the Democrats’s favor. Consequently, “[f]rom 1836 forward, 
the highly organized mass party has been an essential feature of American politics and the foundation 
of American governance” (Leonard 274).  
 Moreover, as Jackson had demonstrated, campaign biographies had started playing a more 
prominent role during the campaign period. Crockett had concluded his ‘anti-’biography of Van Buren 
by noting that he was dangerous: one should “[a]lways suspect a man who affects great softness of 
manner, an unruffled evenness of temper, and an enunciation studied and slow. These things are 
unnatural, and speak a degree of mental discipline into which he that has no purpose of craft or design 
to answer cannot submit to drill himself. The most successful knaves are usually of this description, as 
smooth as razors dipt in oil, and as sharp” (Crockett 208-9). In contrast, the biographies that were 
written by two other biographers, William Emmons and William Holland, spread a more favorable 
record of Van Buren’s character and activities. The description of Van Buren in relation to the 
American Eagle that is “[…] holding in his beak a scroll, on which is inscribed ‘Van Buren, 
Democracy, Union and Liberty’” (Emmons v) is symbolic for these biographers’s high esteem of Van 
Buren. Additionally, they offered two accounts that not only depicted Martin Van Buren as “[…] one 
of our distinguished Democratic Statesmen […]” (Emmons iii), who possesses “[…] superior ability 
and virtue” (Hollandb 356), but also displayed an abundance of populist and republicanist dimensions. 
 Already in the opening pages of both books, Emmons and Holland advanced populist- and 
republicanist-induced justifications for their biased positions. Emmons’s first justification referred to 
his position as an independent freeman: he had not been a member of the Democratic Party, but had 
nevertheless found good reasons to support Van Buren. He thus implied that he was more trustworthy 
and less predisposed in his presentation of facts than a regular partisan would be. Yet, it was his 
second justification that was of a populist and republicanist nature. Emmons vindicated his support for 
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Van Buren by referring to a statement on the success of Van Buren’s political conducts: “[…] we have 
the testimony of a witness, who must know, and who is incapable of disguising or extenuating the 
truth – we have the testimony of Andrew Jackson […]” (Emmons 43). Above all, the insinuation that a 
testimony of Jackson here is an inherent validation of the facts presented in the biography is both 
sophistic and hardly indisputable. The quotation illustrated Jackson’s endless support of Van Buren, 
but the appeal to Jackson also demonstrated republicanist and populist ideals, as Emmons 
demonstrated that Jackson had become an inherent part of these ideals. This is true in terms of 
republicanism, because in the eyes of many Americans, Jackson had endlessly defended republicanist 
values, like freedom and patriotism, and thus came to embody those. Similarly, the emotional appeals 
that nearly ascribe divinity and inviolability to Jackson also revealed the populist element of 
Emmons’s depiction of Jackson.  
Holland, on the other hand, made more honest remarks about the campaign purpose of his 
writing when he discussed his motivations for subjectivity. He asserted that “[t]he philosophy of 
history is more valuable than its facts. Remarkable, as are the incidents in the life of Mr. Van Buren, 
they would not have attracted the particular attention of the writer if he had not believed, that in laying 
them before the public, an opportunity would be furnished of discussing political principles which are 
of vital importance to the prosperity of our country” (Hollandb viii). Not only can the prophetic 
rhetoric in this quotation be construed as a populist and emotional appeal, but also the references to 
political principles, values and national prosperity suggest a republicanist character. 
 A second feature in the two biographies that revealed both a partisan bias and a populist 
disposition is the extremely negative depiction of Van Buren’s opposition. Whereas Emmons 
portrayed Van Buren as “[…] the firm friend to Democracy […]” (iv), his opponents are depicted as 
“enemies” (27). He also referred to the Whig Party as “[…] the War Party in peace! and the Peace 
Party in war! […]” (iii). Holland presented a similar distinction and differentiated between “[t]he 
democratic party […]” and “[t]he anti-democratic party […]” (79, 80), and “[…] between the friends 
of the constitution and the partisans of aristocratic corruption” (Hollandb 284). Both authors, thus, 
suggested that the Whig Party was an elitist party. In addition, their anti-Whig rhetoric is so 
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persistently emotional and deliberately negative that the authors have demonstrated the further 
development of populism in campaign biographies.  
Yet, paradoxically, Emmons and Holland objected to the abuse and slander that is directed at 
Van Buren. The best example is perhaps the next segment of Holland’s conclusion: 
 
[…] The great mass of the American people are not so meanly endowed and so 
unhappily constituted. There is an honest love of truth, a blunt native judgement, a 
piercing sagacity, in the great mass of the people, which cannot be widely led astray 
from the principles of truth, patriotism and virtue. The demagogue can never meet the 
approbation of these sentiments. Intrigue and hollow-hearted patriotism wither before 
them. They are attracted, instinctively, by the capable and honest public servant; they 
recoil from the political gambler.  
(Hollandb 358) 
 
It is certainly ironic that biographers who themselves participated in a populist and abusive rhetoric 
demanded of others to abide by the adagio “to do unto others as they would have others do unto them” 
(Emmons 44). Yet, their paradoxical stance can be explained from their partisan point of view: Van 
Buren’s campaign strategy may exhibit multiple populist characteristics, but the man himself was 
rather anti-populist: he was selected by Jackson through patronage, and he was an elitist and 
professionalist who was distrusted by the general public. As a result, Emmons and Holland have, as 
advocates of Van Buren, regularly critiqued oppositional demagoguery to counter the criticism that 
was directed at Van Buren (e.g. Emmons iii-v, 40-4; Hollandb 50, 358, 363).  
 Throughout the rest of the two biographies, Van Buren is largely displayed in populist and 
republicanist terms as well. Emmons frequently refers to Van Buren in relation to patriotism and the 
people’s sovereignty, in an effort to demonstrate his republicanist character. Moreover, he described 
Van Buren in relation to “[…] the spirit of the constitution […]” (17), the Jeffersonian principles (iv) 
and “[…] the popular cause […]” (9), and noted that Van Buren “[…] owes nothing to birth or 
ancestry” (38). All these aspects can be construed as coinciding with the ideology of republicanism 
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and in part with populism. Moreover, while Emmons’s rhetoric also displayed purely populist features, 
one in particular stood out. In the closing pages of his book, he presented a description of Van Buren’s 
appearance, as a component of the populist strategy that had to appeal to the reader’s emotionality: 
 
In person, Mr. Van Buren is neither above nor below the middle height; his figure is 
erect and graceful – his frame slender and apparently delicate, but capable of 
sustaining severe and long continued exertion – the general expression of his features, 
animated and agreeable – his eye quick and piercing – his head, (which is now quite 
bald,) particularly his forehead, of unusual size and admirable formation (Emmons 39).
  
As this illustration is remarkably expressive, it is all the more interesting that Holland offered a nearly 
identical glorification of Van Buren’s appearance: 
  
In personal appearance, Mr. Van Buren is about the middle size; his form is erect and 
slender, but is said to be capable of great endurance. His features are animated and 
expressive, especially the eye, which is indicative of quick apprehension and close 
observation; his forehead exhibits, in its depth and expansion, the marks of great 
intellectual power. 
 (Hollandb 364) 
 
A critical reader will have observed to what extent both descriptions of Van Buren coincide. The 
remarks on Van Buren’s figure, his eye, his forehead and even his mental capability are nearly 
identical, with only slight alterations in use of language. It is unclear what brought about this overlap, 
but, considering that both biographies were published in the same year, plagiarism seems unlikely. In 
addition, it is equally questionable to assume that similarities were the result of close cooperation 
between Holland and Emmons in working on their respective biographies, as there are no historical 
records of links between both men. As a consequence, one has to resort to the only remaining 
plausible explanation for this degree of overlap: perhaps the similarities are the result of an 
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overarching management of the campaign writings, although, admittedly, assuming this disposition 
would be based more on educated guessing than on empirical evidence.  
Moreover, in both passages it is clear that the authors appealed to a certain populist sentiment 
that had to engage the electorate further with Van Buren, given that most voters had no idea of his 
appearance.
 
Moreover, the rest of Holland’s biography of Van Buren depicted a similar populist and 
republicanist rhetoric. He continuously referred to Van Buren’s humble descent, which is typical for 
republicanism, and his anti-elitist upbringing (Hollandb 13-5). Also, Van Buren’s severe resistance 
against the renewal of the charter of the Bank, a disposition that he shared with Jackson, stemmed 
from the republicanist and anti-elitist notion that it only endangered the general public and would 
solely benefit the privileged few (Hollandb 86, 299-300). Similarly, his adherence to Jeffersonian 
principles and his wish to remove all interference of the House of Representatives in the presidential 
election, as this impeached true sovereignty, reveals the rhetorical importance of republicanism in the 
biography of Van Buren (Holland 82, 219). 
 Yet, both Emmons and Holland also intermittently articulated a rhetoric that resisted populist 
and republicanist sentiments. As paradoxical as their critique on demagoguery, they displayed Van 
Buren not only through a populist and republicanist lens, but also used a sporadically anti-populist, 
professionalist and elitist rhetoric. Such rhetoric is primarily used to depict Van Buren’s moderate 
personality and his traditionalist character that resembled both the characters of politicians in the old, 
pre-Adams era and the set of traits that Machiavelli named virtù. It is, thus, no coincidence that 
historian and economist Hummel described Van Buren as a “[…] consummate back-room strategist 
[…]” (Hummela 255): this description accurately reflects on how Van Buren combined a tactical and 
office-seeking approach with a compromising and policy-making one. Yet, where orthodox 
professionalism and elitism dominated Van Buren’s personality, they are relatively absent in both 
biographies. As a result, one could conclude that there is perhaps some truth in the words of Crockett: 
“[…] the people are tricked and cheated, and what is worse, they are satisfied to stay so” (Crockett 3): 
they generously absorbed the rhetorical populism and republicanism that dominated both biographies 
of Van Buren. However, the notions of populism and republicanism in his rhetoric do not 
automatically mean that Van Buren employed Outsiderism. As Outsiderism is inherently strategic, one 
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needs to determine whether his motivations for using this rhetoric were genuine or strategic. To give 
an indication of what his motivation was, the next section explores to what extent there are 
discrepancies between his populist and republicanist rhetoric on the one hand and his policy on the 
other.  
 
ii. Policy and Practice under Van Buren 
On March 4, 1837, Van Buren was inaugurated into office and officially succeeded Jackson as 
President of the US (Hummela 255). The Democratic Party again had won the majority vote, although 
the margins had been smaller than four years earlier. It was clear that Van Buren did not enjoy a 
Jackson-like authority and was generally disliked among the public, but party support had helped 
overcome these issues. In the first weeks in office, he surrounded himself with friends and followers, 
who praised his judgment and discretion, and who called him “as polished and captivating a person in 
the social circle as America has ever known” (Foote, in Cole 285). The encouraging sentiments of 
these first weeks, however, proved to be temporary, as more and more issues required the full attention 
of Van Buren’s cabinet. The revolution in Texas in June 1836 had disrupted diplomatic relations with 
Mexico; conflicts with Indians and particularly the Seminole War in Florida remained unresolved; and 
the nation was deeply divided over the issue of slavery. Yet, amidst the process of appointing cabinet 
members, it was the economic downgrade that needed Van Buren’s attention first and foremost, and 
that would be the constant throughout his years as Chief Executive (Cole 285-6).  
  For some months and following an economic boost in the previous years, the progress and 
stability of the financial system in America had been exposed to speculations. Prices had doubled 
within a few years, interest rates were climbing and the value of property grew significantly. 
Speculations were not negated by Van Buren’s inaugurational speech, as he did not specify his 
economic intentions, nor by the opposing economic stances that were put forth by several Jacksonians 
and Whigs. Finally, “[a]fter the dizzy expansion of 1835 and 1836 the bottom suddenly fell out” (Cole 
292). It was the result of several factors, including the collapse of the foreign trade system, the absence 
of hard money (i.e. gold and silver coins) in relation to the general suspicion of paper money, and the 
monetary policy of the former administration that had redirected its funds after the Bank War. With 
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banks growing more cautious to disburse loans, as particularly cotton companies from the South failed 
to repay their debts, the nation was awaiting Van Buren’s solution. When initially his reaction held 
off, economic anxiety started spiralling so rapidly that already in May the newspapers spoke of the 
Panic of 1837. The economy had been starting to spiral downwardly (Cole 285-93). 
 For the newly elected president, it took long consideration to decide on what governmental 
remedies would boost the American economy, afraid to make a too radical shift. Although the 
Democrats were unanimous in their opinion that the national bank was the enemy, party officials were 
split over a solution. The first bloc of Democrats presented Van Buren with the option to continue 
along Jackson’s lines, who had vetoed the bill that would recharter the Second Bank during the Bank 
War, which for Van Buren meant adhering to the existing state bank deposit system of 1833. More 
importantly, “[b]y doing so he would keep faith with the past and would continue to draw on the 
magic of Jackson’s name” (Curtis 262). Yet, Van Buren put his money on the second bloc, as he 
believed only a departure from Jackson’s stance would halt the downward spiral. He therefore 
developed a new mechanism for dealing with public revenue management: he proposed an 
independent treasury system that would separate national government from state banks and 
subsequently from the bank’s paper currency that kept depreciating. Many heavily critiqued the bill, 
but on October 3, 1837, it passed the Senate by two votes. Two weeks later, when the bill reached the 
House of Representatives, it was, however, blocked and left Van Buren distressed and empty-handed 
(Cole 291-304; Hummela 260-4).  
To summarize, Curtis asserted that Van Buren had become a victim of the Panic of 1837: 
“[p]ut quite simply, the 19th century presidency was not strong enough to withstand the Panic that 
engulfed the nation’s finances and its politics” (262). While Van Buren indeed suffered disadvantages 
that resulted from the financial malaise, as indicated by the Democrats’s electoral losses during local 
elections in the fall of 1837, the president also succeeded in restarting the banking businesses in 1838. 
Moreover, “Van Buren’s refusal to abandon the goal of divorce ultimately paid off as the political tide 
turned in late 1839” (Hummela 265). In late January of 1840, the Senate passed the bill. Four months 
later the bill sailed through the House as well and, metaphorically, Van Buren signed the bill himself 
on Independence Day in 1840. Independent treasury announced a new era in government-banking 
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relations and its initial effects were as hoped: it brought financial stability and trust back. It had, 
however, taken too long for Van Buren and the Panic pushed the outcome of the presidential election 
of 1840 in the Whigs’s favor, who annulled the bill in 1841. (Cole 291-304, 317-41; Hummela 260-6; 
Niven 403-24). Had Van Buren once been called the ‘Magician’, “[b]y 1840 the magic was gone” 
(Cole 378). 
Furthermore, “[e]ver since 1837 historians have tried to fit Van Buren’s […] independent 
treasury into their own interpretations of Jacksonian Democracy” (Cole 304). While some scholars, 
such as Schlesinger, Jr., consider Van Buren’s economic actions as Jacksonian for his resistance 
against the “moneyed aristocracy” (Schlesinger, Jr., in Cole 304), others have claimed that his 
financial reform was not Jacksonian reform in spirit. For one, Bodenhorn made this point – a man who 
case studied governmental-banking relations in New York City, and who asserted that free banking 
was not a component of Jacksonian laissez-faire, but instead had “[…] resulted from parallel 
movements begun in the early nineteenth century that called for greater political and economic self-
determination” (254). Indeed, depicting Van Buren’s financial intervention as Jacksonian seems 
erroneous, considering that extra governmental patronage is the opposite of the element of 
noninterventionism in Jacksonian reform. Moreover, it is unlikely that Van Buren, who respected the 
economic elites, would crusade against them (Cole 304-5). However, Cole justly asserts that all of 
these interpretations are either too theoretical or influenced by the author’s political or economic 
approach. “[…] [N]one of the interpretations consider the message from the vantage point of Van 
Buren himself, with his particular personal and political goals” (Cole 305). Thus, given the surplus of 
diverging interpretations, the most prudent approach to the economic malheur and Van Buren’s policy 
response would consider these as background variables to which other policies were shaped. 
Especially three issues dominated during Van Buren’s term as president and can aid in determining 
whether the motives behind Van Buren’s use of republicanism and populism were strategic or 
genuine. The first issue is Van Buren’s Indian policy; the second is the increasingly dominant issue of 
slavery; and the third one is his political reform. 
During his years in office, Van Buren’s Indian policy was in large a continuation of Jackson’s 
policy that had initiated the removal of Indians from May 1830 onward. Most tribes that had lived in 
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southern regions moved to the regions around Oklahoma, albeit unenthusiastically. While some 
northern tribes were voluntarily removed as well, others, in contrast, did not await transportation and 
offered considerable resistance. Two Indian populations in particular exemplified the resistance, 
although in different manners. The first were the Seminole Indians, with whom a war was fought near 
the swamps of Florida. The war was an inheritance of Jackson, who had started waging war against 
the Seminoles in 1835, causing Van Buren now to be faced with “[…] four thousand Seminoles 
mingled with over a thousand blacks, many of them escaped slaves”, who “were putting up effective 
military resistance in Florida” (Hummela 271). Van Buren was heavily criticized for proving incapable 
of solving the matter adequately, mainly by Whigs in Congress, who ignored the fact that the Indian 
issue originated from the removal policy that Jackson had initiated. Regardless, Van Buren’s approach 
to Osceola, the Seminolean tribe leader, and to the war in general was insufficient and poor, as 
indicated by the fact that the war was not ended until after his presidency (Cole 213, 364-5; Hummela 
271-4; Niven 426-7, 464-7).  
The second tribe that opposed voluntary removal was the Cherokee tribe. Spread across 
Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia, and North Carolina, the Cherokees continuously opposed their 
removal. They particularly benefited from their frontman, John Ross, who effectively used his political 
ties. In Congress, he advocated against the administration’s inhumane actions against a hard-working 
and peaceful people. Although Ross’s strategy did not result in legislative gain, it was successful in 
rallying support among American religious groups and humanitarians. To the regret of Van Buren, 
“[t]he prospect of mistreatment [against Indians] at the hands of unscrupulous whites aroused a sense 
of guilt in the minds of many” (Niven 427). The political element here typified Cherokee resistance: it 
resorted to political means, rather than military, to reach its ends. Although the Cherokee move was 
inventive, it only delayed eviction in the end. Van Buren appointed General Scott, a Whig 
sympathiser, to oversee the removal of the 15,000 Cherokees, as he was one of the few men who Van 
Buren believed had the ability to be successful in this endeavor. Although every other Whig would at 
least have considered political mutiny, the general was trustworthy and executed the president’s 
orders. Nevertheless, the forced removal went terrible: Scott’s soldiers committed atrocities against the 
Indians, many other Indians died during the journey to the west on the “Trail of Tears” (Hummela 271) 
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and those who arrived in Oklahoma lacked the bare essentials to survive the cold winter of 1839 (Cole 
364; Hummela 271-2; Niven 426-7). In his second annual message to Congress, President Van Buren, 
however, claimed the near completion of the removal:  
 
It affords me sincere pleasure to be able to apprise you of the entire removal of the 
Cherokee Nation of Indians to their new homes west of the Mississippi. […] The 
successful accomplishment of this important object, the removal also of the entire 
Creek nation with the exception of a small number of fugitives amongst the Seminoles 
in Florida, the progress already made toward a speedy completion of the removal of 
the Chickasaws, the Choctaws, the Pottawatamies, the Ottawas, and the Chippewas, 
with the extensive purchases of Indian lands during the present year, have rendered 
the speedy and successful result of the long-established policy of the Government 
upon the subject of Indian affairs entirely certain. 
(Van Burenb) 
 
This presentation of facts is in stark contrast with the criticism Van Buren had received for both the 
barbarity of his actions and “[…] the army’s inability to defeat a wretched little band of […] desperate 
Indians who had refused to emigrate” (Niven 465). Neither does his account do justice to the 
considerable resistance from Indian tribes over the course of time. Yet, most worrisome to Van Buren 
was the issue of money. The Panic had already caused financial difficulties, and these removal treaties 
added to the millions of costs in governmental funding. Just the removal of Seminoles and Cherokees 
had cost an incredible $50 million, which was money that the government could not afford to miss, as 
Van Buren’s critics noted as well. Consequently, his popularity dropped to an ultimate low in 1840 
(Hummela 271-4; Niven 464-7).  
 Yet, to what extent was the hostile continuation of the Indian policy under Van Buren 
congruent with his claims on Indians prior to his presidency? It is interesting to note that the 
biographies of Emmons and Holland are remarkably reserved on the matter, although, unlike Holland, 
Emmons does not fully ignore the Indian question. The lack of treatment is curious, as the Indian 
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removal issue had played a dominant role in federal politics since it surfaced in 1830. Two remarks 
have, however, been made by Van Buren in Emmons’s biography and put his policy into perspective. 
The first segment is extracted from the appendix to Emmons’s biography, and entails a quotation of 
Van Buren from years earlier, in 1813:  
 
While the Indians war hoop and the British drum, are in unison saluting the ears, the 
British dagger and the Indian tomahawk suspended over the heads of our citizens, – 
at such a time, when the soul of every man who has sensibility to feel his country’s 
wrongs, and the spirit to defend her rights, should be in arms – it is that they cry 
peace!  
(Emmons 55)  
 
Considering that Emmons mentioned the Indians in combination with the British, this quotation 
indicates that Van Buren saw the Indians as a threat to peace equal to the British. But, while this could 
suggest congruency with Van Buren’s presidential policy, some twenty-odd years later, such a 
conclusion would be premature, as a second quotation in the Emmons’s biography demonstrates that 
Van Buren had adopted a different – that is, a more positive – stance toward Indians in the campaign:  
 
For one, I do not doubt the native as well as adopted freemen of my country, will, at 
the approaching presidential election, prove to the surrounding nations of the earth, 
that American citizens are superior to any and all combinations that have been or 
may be entered into for the overthrow of democracy. 
(Emmons iv) 
 
This quotation illustrates a divergence from his former negative opinion towards Indians. But, 
more significantly, it also diverges from Van Buren’s hostile Indian policy of large-scale removal, 
which was without the fair treatment of natives. Natives did not share a fate with whites, as his policy 
upheld the inhumane and brutal treatment of Indians. Considering this, one could speak of a 
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discrepancy: there is a clear (although quantitatively minimal) difference between Van Buren’s 
positive attitude toward the Indians as described in Emmons’s biography and his inimical attitude 
whilst in office. On the basis of this discrepancy, one could consider Van Buren’s populist and 
republicanist claims on Indians in the biography as Outsiderist claims that only derived from strategic 
campaign purposes. However, this conclusion needs to be handled with caution: the biographies 
provide relatively little evidence on the Indian matter, but, more importantly, such a conclusion would 
ignore that Van Buren inherited large parts of Jackson’s Indian policy, which to some extent restricted 
his policy options. Yet, as Van Buren could have made different choices in spite of this inheritance, 
the claim that there is a discrepancy between his rhetoric and his policy holds.  
The issue of slavery offers better opportunities to analyse Van Buren’s employment of 
Outsiderism, because he discussed the matter openly in campaign biographies. As Shade accurately 
noted, Van Buren’s southern supporters demanded his firmness on three aspects of the slavery issue: 
“Congress could not interfere with slavery in the states; it was ‘impolitic’ to abolish slavery in the 
District of Columbia; and agitation of the subject endangered the Union” (Shade 471). In Holland’s 
campaign biography it becomes clear to what extent Van Buren in reality adhered to these southern 
sentiments. Although it took Holland until the final chapters of the book to discuss Van Buren’s stance 
on slavery, which could be an indication of the delicacy and difficulty of the issue for Van Buren, it is 
expressed in the following passage: 
 
The subject is, in my judgment, exclusively under the control of state governments; 
and I am not apprised, nor do I believe that a contrary opinion, to an extent deserving 
consideration, is entertained in any part of the United States. The charge, therefore, 
to which you have had the goodness to call my attention, that I ‘am in favor of an 
interference by Congress, in manumitting your slave property’, is destitute of 
foundation: so far from it, I do not see on what authority the General Government 
could interfere, without a change of the Constitution, even at the instance of either or 
of all the slave holding States. 
(Hollandb 345-6) 
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Thus, by denouncing abolition as an unconstitutional violation of state rights, he affirmed to share an 
anti-abolitionist disposition with his southern supporters. Moreover, the fact that this passage as part of 
a letter was also published by the Democratic Party in a local newspaper reveals that it was explicitly 
used for campaign purposes (Hollandb 345).  
A second integrated piece of correspondence between Van Buren and a man from Georgia 
demonstrated a similar rhetoric, both in its stance and in its campaign motive. But while his stance 
remained unaltered, it is interesting to note that Van Buren became more explicitly aware of the 
importance of the issue of slavery in the approaching election of 1836 in terms of garnering support. 
For one, he was critical of the “[…] unsupported assertions of my enemies […]” (in Hollandb 347). 
Van Buren wrote: “[t]he allegations which attribute to me views and opinions that are so justly 
obnoxious to the slave-holding states, are made in the face of the most explicit declarations on my 
part, denying all authority on the part of the Federal Government to interfere in the matter” (in 
Hollandb 346). A logical motivation for his firmness here is the securing of Southern voters, in 
reaction to the Whig strategy of swaying voters away from the Democratic Party by discrediting Van 
Buren in the South. Other segments, too, confirmed Van Buren’s campaign motive for writing: in 
expressing the hope that Southerners “[…] give me their confidence […]” (in Hollandb 347), Van 
Buren, in fact, called directly for southern support in the next election. This seems to suggest that Van 
Buren’s anti-abolitionist stance was motivated by vote-maximizing and Outsiderist incentives rather 
than by his personal beliefs.  
Yet, that conclusion would be too preliminary. A comparison between his actions as president 
and his slavery standpoint in the biography provides further insights in Van Buren’s use of 
Outsiderism. To what extent were his actions in accordance with the claim that abolishing slavery was 
in conflict with the constitutionally set cleavage between federal and state rights? His political 
response to a number of slavery questions clarifies this question. One issue that emerged with the 
westward expansion of colonists was the Texas Revolution. That revolution had ignited only two 
months prior to Van Buren’s presidency, in October of 1835. In March 1836, Texas declared 
independence from Mexico, which raised the question whether or not Texas was to be included in the 
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Union (Rathbun 461). The possibility of annexing Texas did not only deteriorate relations with 
Mexico, but it also triggered resistance from abolitionists who believed “[…] that expanding slavery 
across the Southwest would corrupt the civic foundations of the republic”. They “[…] urged the nation 
to cultivate the inner resources of the republic rather than pursue an expansionist policy […]” 
(Rathbun 459). Many abolitionists did not oppose an expansionist policy per se, but they did so in 
opposition to the expansion of slavery. Therefore, they argued that Texas should not be annexed: 
doing so would ignore the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819 that had consigned Florida to the Union 
and that had subsequently defined the borders between the Union and Mexico. Their most important 
objection was, however, that a Texas annexation would violate the balance that was brought by the 
Missouri Compromise of 1820, which arranged slavery within the Union (Rathbun 461-2).  
The new president was torn over the issue: Van Buren’s campaign strategy of emphasizing 
state rights was an attempt to bring northern and southern Democrats back together, but whatever he 
now decided on Texas, it would unavoidably evoke criticism. Ratifying Texas’s annexation would 
infuriate northerners and abolitionists; denying the annexation meant denying the Southern cause, 
which would arouse greater suspicion amongst Southern, pro-slavery Democrats. Therefore, Van 
Buren “[…] charged Congress with the responsibility for making the ultimate decision on recognition” 
(Curtis 257). Such course of action was exemplary for Van Buren, who with diplomatic behavior 
attempted to steer away the pubic anxiety about the slavery question from his office. Additionally, his 
careful approach was the opposite of Jackson’s rather hands-on approach during the Nullification 
Crisis, but it was effective in terms of calming both halves of his electorate and preventing a standoff 
between the two (Curtis 256-8). Finally, in October 1838, opponents to annexation proved most 
persuasive and it was agreed upon that Texas would not be annexed by the Union. It would take 
another seven years, until the presidency of John Tyler, for the Union to change its mind on the matter 
(Rathbun 473).  
Another issue that revealed Van Buren’s position on slavery is the Amistad affair. In August, 
1839, the Amistad, a Spanish ship, entered the harbor of Montauk Point, Long Island. On board were 
53 illegally captured African slaves, who were victimized by the Spanish and who had finally decided 
to revolt: they had killed the captain, imprisoned the crew and taken control of the vessel. The 
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Africans were charged with murder and piracy, and were put in prison. A long court case now waited. 
The Spanish demanded Van Buren to hand over the men to them, but Van Buren realized that he could 
not do so without violating the power of the judicial branch. The men were thus tried in court; the 
judges ruled that the Spanish illegally captured the men and that the court had no jurisdiction on 
international seas, and could therefore not convict them for murder and piracy. Although Van Buren 
sent the case to the Supreme Court, with the help of an aging John Quincy Adams the defense of the 
Africans was solid. Finally, in March, 1841, the Supreme Court issued its verdict: the Amistad 
survivors were set free and all charges were dropped (Cole 363-4; Niven 466-7; Snediker and Amer 
16-7). The case proved helpful for the abolitionist movement in the years after: it helped garnering 
public attention to abolition and therefore motivated abolitionists to use the judiciary system to defend 
their cause as well. But the case also had an effect on Van Buren: “[t]he Abolitionist and Whig press 
in the North accused Van Buren of aiding and abetting kidnappers and slave catchers, of prostituting 
the federal government and his position as chief magistrate to that end” (Niven 468). “Prostitution”, in 
this case, referred to Van Buren’s support of the Spaniards and his attempts to use his presidential 
power to influence a judicial decision on their behalf.  
Yet, to construe Van Buren’s stance in the case of the Amistad as an expression of his anti-
abolitionist claims in Holland’s campaign biography would ignore the influence of Spanish pressure. 
Van Buren’s interference with the Amistad case was not motivated by his stance on slavery, but by his 
diplomatic interests in maintaining strong relations with the Spaniards. At most one could say that 
“[i]n his handling of the Amistad case Van Buren went out of his way to win the favor of southern 
slaveholders” (Cole 363), but his meddling was predominantly induced by the wish for a strong 
foreign policy. An indication of this is that he “[…] assured the Spanish ambassador that the 
administration would take steps to return the slaves as soon as the district court had ruled” (Cole 363). 
Likewise, another indication is his executive order to place the Africans on a war ship to immediately 
bring them to their Spanish owners in case of a (for him) favorable outcome (Cole 363-4).  
William Shade concluded his article by noting that “[a]lthough President Van Buren avoided 
the divisive Texas issue, he proved to be friendly to the interests of slaveholders at every turn” (481). 
However, a factual interpretation of his policy, particularly with regards to the Texas Revolution, 
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suggests otherwise. While his decision to send the issue to Congress was both typical and innovative, 
it also was deflective and thus meant that he refused to recognize the wish of southern slaveholders to 
annex Texas as the newest scion of slave-holding states. Considering that he expressed the wish to 
resist abolition in 1835, it is remarkable that Van Buren pivoted the issue of annexation around the 
Senate. In comparison, the immediate acceptance of annexation would have been more in congruence 
with his campaign rhetoric on maintaining slavery, as there was little doubt that Texas, once accepted 
as a state, would become a slave-holding state. This suggests, thus, a discrepancy between his words 
that aimed to promote slavery, and his actions that did not seize the opportunity that Texas offered.  
Yet, this discrepancy can be somewhat negated, as, admittedly, he had to react to the political 
situation of that time. As many scholars have noted, Van Buren was constantly aware of the tensions 
between the North and South with regards to slavery, and, as it damaged the unity among Democrats, 
he meant to decrease those frictions. “Silencing slavery agitation” had his priority, Curtis noted (257). 
As annexing Texas would have instigated anger among northern abolitionists and thus would only 
have advanced regional tensions, the blocking of the annexation had to help Van Buren to maintain a 
healthy balance between northerners and southerners, particularly within the party.  
But despite these reservations, the tracing of Van Buren’s slavery rhetoric throughout the 
several decades clarifies that his campaign rhetoric in 1835 was indeed Outsiderist. Throughout the 
years, Van Buren had proved to be very capricious in his assessment of the issue, as he had changed 
his opinion on slavery a number of times. For one, his pro-slavery stance in 1835 was a divergence 
from what he had said earlier: “[…] in 1824, he decided that slavery was unjust, a moral blemish on 
American society that professed freedom and equality” (Niven 385). Another indication for 
divergence was his endorsement of abolition in Missouri in the past (Hummela 272). Similarly, his 
1835 stance differed from the viewpoint he expressed after his presidency in 1848, when he ran for 
president on the ballot of the Free Soil Party, an anti-slavery party (Hummela 255). By taking all of 
this as evidence of Van Buren’s “true” perception of slavery, it seems likely that Van Buren’s anti-
abolitionist rhetoric during the campaign was strategic and was solely meant to secure the Southern 
vote. Subsequently, this indicates that Van Buren employed Outsiderism, because he strategically 
referred to republicanist claims on the importance of state rights in relation to slavery. The extent to 
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which his use of republicanism and populism is inconsistent and tactical is demonstrated by his 
capriciousness on the issue of slavery. 
 A final issue that deserves elaboration is Van Buren’s overall reform of politics. The 
aforementioned reform of the banking system (that introduced free banking and the independent 
treasury system in reaction to the Panic) is exemplary of how Van Buren used the political situation of 
specific cases to enlarge the role of his office (Bodenhorn 244-54). Also in the broader terms of 
presidential and party reform Van Buren has played a valuable part in the shaping of American 
politics. In anticipation of the election, his biographies depicted a partisan image of Van Buren that 
emphasized to extent to which his Democratic Party adhered to republicanist values, whereas the 
opposition was aristocratic, corrupted the Constitution and corrupted American values. In his 
biography, Emmons wrote that his account of Van Buren would “[…] exhibit the sound, democratic 
and statesman-like principles, by which his [Van Buren’s] conduct has been governed […]” (vi). 
Similarly, Holland asserted that his writing on Van Buren is “[…] an account of his life and opinions 
[…]” and, thus, “[…] a text book of democratic principles” (35).  
In contrast, an empirical analysis of Van Buren’s political actions once in office suggests that 
he in many instances neglected these very democratic principles by demonstrating a political style as a 
president that brought rather elitist, intellectual and professional features to the White House. Unlike 
Jackson, Van Buren limited his use of the spoils system that had brought considerably more power to 
the presidency under Jackson (Cole 291). Neither did he use his veto power as frequently as Jackson 
had. Still, Van Buren did seek to expand presidential power, for example by renewing “[…] friendly 
relations between the executive and legislative branches of government” (Curtis 259). Considering the 
nationwide economic downfall and the relations with Congress that had depraved under his 
predecessor, Van Buren was keen to exploit, or at least to employ, his office in a manner that would 
bring back harmony among politicians. He therefore decided to establish many friendly relations 
within Congress, which effectively led to many political advantages, but also to a style of backroom 
politics and a decline of presidential independence. The extent to which Van Buren was personally 
involved with people in the legislative branch is exemplified in Curtis’s following record: 
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[…] [T]wo of his closest political advisors were members of Congress. New York’s 
Churchill C. Cambreleng, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, had 
corresponded with Van Buren for years and was instrumental in fashioning legislative 
responses to the panic of 1837. In the Senate, Van Buren’s protégé Silas Wright 
headed the important finance committee and was floor manager for administration 
bills.  
(Curtis 258) 
 
Yet, Van Buren did not only act as a political power broker among Congressmen, but he also 
successfully removed intrigue and disunity from his cabinet. Evidently, the dismissal of the spoils 
system helped, as this had only invigorated competition for cabinet positions, but Van Buren also 
avoided appointing presidential aspirants in the cabinet. Additionally, he sought to maintain loyalty as 
well as balance among cabinet members, which effectively resulted into a rigid stability that was in 
stark contrast with the in-cabinet battles under Jackson (Curtis 258-61).  
 Moreover, Van Buren did not only mean to improve political relations because he valued a 
strong Congress and cabinet, but also because “[…] he hoped to revive Democratic discipline” (Curtis 
258). He wanted to unify his party and to break through the North-South axis that had resulted from 
differences in the issue of slavery and finances. Like a true elitist, he repeatedly granted favors for 
political purposes to party members, and occasionally made compromises and bargains with 
Democrats, many of whom were in Congress as well (Curtis 256-61). While there is certainly some 
merit to his power brokering, such as improved political relations in the cabinet, the party and the two 
legislative houses claimed that another consequence was the removal of republicanist ideas. His 
policies of patronage and networking created a presidency, “[…] not as powerful counterweight to 
Congress but as agency of accommodation” (Curtis 256); he surrounded himself with a network of 
political associates, but as a result sacrificed the political independence of his office to some extent, 
which went directly against the drafted separation of powers. Moreover, his political style drew more 
power to the White House in general, and thus contrasted the Jeffersonian principles of a limited 
government that he had adhered to in his campaign biographies.  
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A similar violation of republicanist ideas had been Van Buren’s inheritance of the presidency. 
Obviously, he was elected into office, but it had, in fact, been his use of partisan ties that structured the 
political succession of 1836. The very democratic principles that were upheld in his biographies, 
including popular sovereignty, were thus relatively absent in the nomination of Van Buren for the 
presidency. To take these several discrepancies into account is, thus, to assume that Van Buren 
employed an Outsiderist strategy: he tactically adhered to republicanist ideas of sovereignty and 
limited government, but as a president he rather neglected these values. The irony of Van Buren’s 
deployment of the Outsiderist strategy is that his compromising, yet brokering and manipulative style 
of political warfare had made him a political insider in Washington. He had become a political 
professional, who intelligently used his political relations to reach his ends. Yet, more than a political 
broker, Van Buren was a partisan and a strategist: his actions were meant to unify the Democrats, but 
mainly to maintain a strong voter base.  
So, in sum, the campaign biographies on Van Buren that were written by Emmons and 
Holland depicted the considerable prevalence of a populist and republicanist rhetoric in the campaign 
of 1836. Both books claimed the importance of Van Buren for democratic principles, whereas the 
opposition posed a threat to freedom and Jeffersonian principles in their aristocratic and anti-
democratic approach to the country. The discrepancy-based analysis of his Indian policy, slavery and 
reform policy once in office has demonstrated that his campaign rhetoric of populism and 
republicanism was indeed strategic. This suggests that Van Buren used Outsiderism in the campaign 
for the purpose of vote-maximization. Unlike the cases of Jackson, did the cases of Van Buren 
collectively show discrepancies between policy and rhetoric. Therefore, one can conclude that Van 
Buren employed Outsiderism, and even more so than Jackson had done in the past. Nevertheless, Van 
Buren’s time in office was short-lived. After the election of 1840, William Harrison, who had 
surprised the electorate with a brilliant log cabin campaign, succeeded him and became the first Whig 
president. Van Buren lost due to a combination of his personality and an office that could not 
withstand the systemic pressures of economic malaise. He left his office a bitter and exhausted man. 
What had been said about him in the campaign of 1840 had become a reality: “Van, Van the used up 
man” (Curtis 262) is what they called him and that is the way most historians remember him. 
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6. Conclusion           
Electoral competition has been an essential part of acquiring the American presidency since 
Jackson’s election of 1828. Competition made strategic considerations to ensure the maximization of 
electoral support increasingly relevant. One phenomenon that traditionally dominated strategic 
thinking during American elections is Outsiderism: during campaigns candidates deliberately assume 
an outsider position in the electoral arena, not on the basis of genuine motivations, but for the 
categorical purpose of vote-maximization. The foundations of this have been explained in the 
theoretical framework and demonstrated that candidates garner support by appropriating a set of 
public sentiments, including governmental distrust, anti-intellectualism and anti-professionalism. It 
also developed a neo-Downsian model within the realm of Rational Choice Theory, which assumed 
that presidential candidates are rational actors who realize that the electorate is highly polarised and, as 
a result, favors an outsider candidate in elections.  
This thesis offered an investigation of Outsiderism, by analyzing its roots in the subsequent 
campaigns of Jackson and Van Buren. The analyses of both men’s use of Outsiderism consisted of two 
parts. First, an analysis of their respective campaign biographies was presented, which demonstrated 
the degree to which candidates referred in their campaigns to sentiments that overlapped with 
populism and republicanism. This was then followed by a study that investigated the motivations 
behind that campaign rhetoric by comparing it to their policies once elected into office. Comparing the 
two on multiple policy areas demonstrated to what extent presidential policy was a continuation of 
campaign rhetoric: an overlap between rhetoric and policy vis-à-vis indicated genuine motivations for 
campaign rhetoric, but when discrepancies between the two occur, one could consider the motivations 
for deploying campaign rhetoric as strategic. This was tested in both the cases of Jackson and Van 
Buren. 
In the case of Jackson, Eaton presented a republicanist and populist account of Jackson’s life 
and military services in the campaign biography. Jackson was an ordinary, humble, yet responsible 
man, who in many ways resembled the Jack Downing character of Seba Smith’s book. The high 
degree of republicanism and populism in his campaign biography was then compared to the policies of 
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Jackson as president with regards to the Indian removal, the Nullification Crisis and his political 
reform policy. His Indian policy did not illustrate discrepancies with what Jackson had said about 
Indians in the past: his policy on the large-scale removal of Indians to the west indicated that Indians 
remained a threat to the security and liberty of the white American people. The second issue, 
nullification, had evoked a debate between unionists and state rights. Jackson shared his view with the 
unionists, which can be construed as contradictory to his past support of the Jeffersonian principles 
that included state rights. This discrepancy with his campaign rhetoric suggests that Jackson employed 
Outsiderism in his campaign. This notion is amplified by the discrepancy between the policy and 
rhetoric on political reform. Although Jackson indeed translated his rhetoric into policy by introducing 
both rotation in office and the spoils system, he only used the new mechanisms sporadically. He 
remained a traditionalist and conservative, who saw in the ideal of reform more merits than in reform 
itself. Therefore, in conclusion, it would be fair to claim that Jackson employed Outsiderism in his 
campaigns, at least to some extent. The many discrepancies between campaign rhetoric and 
presidential policy illustrate the use of this new campaign strategy in American competitive politics.  
With party competition fully commencing under Van Buren, he proved to be the first 
presidential candidate to fully adhere to Outsiderism in campaign rhetoric. In the case of Van Buren, 
the biographies of Emmons and Holland demonstrated an abundance of republicanist and populist 
dimensions. They depicted a partisan image that was both emotional and abusive of political 
opponents. This campaign rhetoric was then compared to his presidential policy on the Indian 
removal, on slavery and on presidential and party reform. All policies illustrated discrepancies with his 
former rhetoric. His Indian policy diverged from his positive campaign remarks about the equality 
between whites and natives, although, admittedly, neither Emmons nor Holland had in their 
biographies been elaborate on his Indian stance. The issue of slavery was more substantial. Van Buren 
had in anticipation of the elections adopted both a state rights and an anti-abolitionist stance, but he 
did not seize the opportunity that the Texas Revolution offered. While this line of thought is logical, 
because the annexation would have meant a loss in party support in the north, it was his capriciousness 
over time that suggested that his campaign rhetoric on abolition was solely induced by strategic aims. 
Finally, the campaign biographies depicted Van Buren as an ordinary, an anti-elitist. Although his 
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limited use of veto and the spoils system underscored this, his presidential policy in reality advanced 
elitist behavior and enlarged presidential power. Van Buren participated in backroom politics, and 
established a system that bred patronage and political favors at the expense of presidential 
independence. Van Buren posed as a political power broker and, ironically, proved to be an insider 
using Outsiderism. His political reform was therefore a divergence from the republicanist ideals that 
he claimed to value in the campaign biographies. In sum, whereas Jackson had been the first president 
to experiment with the use of Outsiderism, the strategy was fully employed under Van Buren. 
This thesis has presented the latest reflection on the motivations of candidates during 
campaigns. It has validated the importance of RCT in explaining these motivations: the campaigns of 
Jackson and Van Buren have indicated the rational and strategic character of candidates in the 
American political domain. But while this thesis has presented an analysis of the origins of 
Outsiderism, it is up to future research to elaborate on its implications. Two particular paths can be 
chosen in this. The first path involves a social science approach that further examines the applicability 
of the neo-Downsian model in the context of RCT and polarization. The historical path, on the other 
hand, involves the study of in the decades and centuries after Van Buren. Perhaps historical 
investigations of many campaigns, including Obama’s campaign of 2008, could provide new insights 
in the century-old development of Outsiderism. 
Finally, with the winning campaign of Donald Trump in November 2016, he demonstrated the 
latest of example of the use of Outsiderism in the US. We need not look long for possible 
discrepancies between his campaign rhetoric and his future policies. It seems inevitable that he will 
have to let go of his aggressive, populist and occasionally simply unreachable campaign plans. He will 
not abandon NATO. He will not register all American Muslims. And he will not put Hillary Clinton in 
jail. But regardless of the sincerity of the strategy, it was successful in portraying Trump as the 
outsider candidate, who was to be trusted with populist and republicanist values. The American 
electorate was not looking for a professional or political insider, but rather put its faith in a man who 
has no political experience. This is indicative of the difficulties that Outsiderism poses and, 
categorically, of competitive politics in a democracy. Politics have been reduced to a race for 
popularity in a negative electoral climate: it favors anti-professionalism over professionalism, anti-
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intellectualism over intellectualism and empty rhetoric over the willingness to compromise. Paranoia 
has become the motive behind voting. As Hofstadter noted, “we are all sufferers from history, but the 
paranoid is a double sufferer, since he is afflicted not only by the real world, with the rest of us, but by 
his fantasies as well” (Hofstadterc 41). The risk is that we one day might have someone in office 
without the right qualifications. When this degrades democracy and national progress, it would be 
terrible. Only time will tell if Trump is going to be this someone. But in any case, it is time to consider 
alternatives for the way power is granted in one of the most powerful nations on earth.  
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